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The California Controversy Over
Procuring Employment: A Case for the
Personal Managers Act
Heath B. Zarin*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: Annie Artist1 has spent
her entire life dreaming about becoming a movie actor.
Spending the last of her money, Annie moves to Los Angeles
hoping to break into California’s entertainment industry.2
Amidst the glitz and glamour of Hollywood, she believes
that nothing can stop her. Annie, however, soon learns an
unfortunate truth: dreams do not easily come true.3
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Andrew B. Sims for his invaluable comments and criticism. Additionally, I extend my deepest gratitude to Kenneth C. Oh, Mark D. Salzberg,
and H. Peter Nesvold for their insight and encouragement, and to the remaining
editors of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for
their tireless efforts. This Comment is dedicated to my parents for their constant
love and support.
1. All names used in this scenario are fictional.
2. For the purposes of this Comment, the term “entertainment industry” refers to the predominant forms of the entertainment businesses, including music,
video, television, motion pictures, live theater, and radio.
The state of California is a dominant force in the entertainment industry with
motion pictures, television, music, and other arts constituting a significant part
of its economy. See Gary A. Greenberg, The Plight of the Personal Manager in California: A Legislative Solution, in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY 1993, at 485, 487 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 359, 1993); James M. O’Brien III, Regulation of Attorneys Under California’s Talent Agencies Act: Tautological Approach to Protecting
Artists, 80 CAL. L. REV. 471, 472 (1992). The states of Florida and New York, as
well as the city of Nashville, are also significant bases of entertainment-industry
activity. Id. According to some commentators, upper east Tennessee is developing into a mini-Hollywood. Kara Carden, The Region Gets a Slice of Hollywood,
BUS. J. UPPER E. TENN. & SOUTHWEST VA., Nov. 1995, at 40.
3. Many aspiring artists arrive in Los Angeles with dreams of stardom that
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Annie spends her first few weeks in Los Angeles trying
to “get her foot in the door,” but her efforts are an exercise in
futility. She therefore decides to change her game plan, and
spends the next several weeks trying to find a talent agent4
willing to represent her.5
Unfortunately, every talent
6
agency recites the same line in response to her request for
representation: “Sorry, we don’t represent unestablished
artists.” Persistent, Annie continues the struggle to find
work, but without a talent agent, she continues to encounter
only closed doors.
Distressed by her string of failures, Annie contemplates
returning home to her parents. She is, however, unable to
scrounge up enough money to buy a bus ticket home, so she
drops seventy cents into an opened suitcase and begins to
perform a scene from Romeo and Juliet on Santa Monica’s
Third Street Promenade.
As Manny Jerre, a personal manager,7 ambles along the
are never fulfilled. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 481. These artists are in desperate
need of help from representatives in the industry. Id. Some artists, however,
have been able to achieve overnight success. See, e.g., Michael Owen, Catherine,
So Far Beyond the Fringe, EVENING STANDARD, Oct. 4, 1996, at 29 (describing actress Catherine McCormack’s apparent overnight success).
4. Talent agents seek employment for their artist-clients. Greenberg, supra
note 2, at 488; see discussion infra part I.A.1 (describing the talent agent’s role in
the entertainment industry).
5. Unestablished artists have great difficulty finding agents willing to represent them. See, e.g., Robert Simonson, How to Contact Agents Effectively by Mail;
Postal Tips for Actors Trying to Find Agents, BACK STAGE, Nov. 29, 1996, at 24 (explaining that Penny Luedke, an agent with the Gilchrist Talent Group, believes
that an inexperienced artist’s attempts to obtain an agent are futile).
6. Talent agencies organize the efforts of many talent agents to better serve
the interests of their artist-clients. See discussion infra part I.A.1 (explaining why
talent agencies rarely represent aspiring artists).
7. Personal managers advise, counsel, direct, and coordinate the development of their artist-clients’ careers. See HOWARD SIEGEL, ENTERTAINMENT LAW
485, 491 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter SIEGEL I]; Howard Siegel, Personal Management,
in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1989, at 137, 144 (PLI
Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No.
268, 1989) [hereinafter Siegel II]; Hal I. Gilenson, Badlands: Artist-Personal Manager Conflicts of Interest in the Music Industry, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 509
(1991); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 482; David A. Steinberg & Yakub Hazzard, “Employment Services” May Trigger Act, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 25, 1996, at B7; Personal Man-
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promenade, Annie’s performance catches his eye. Captivated by Annie’s raw acting abilities, Manny introduces
himself to the aspiring actress and explains how he can help
her become a star. He tells her, “With my help, you could be
the next Julia Roberts. But, you will need formal training.”
Hearing this, Annie begins to worry. She can barely
support herself, let alone afford acting lessons. Manny,
however, quickly assuages her anxiety with soothing words:
“Don’t worry kid. I’ll pay for your lessons, and I’ll lend you
money to live on until we hit the big time.” Annie smiles
with relief, thinking that her “break” finally, after several
long weeks, had come.
Soon thereafter, Annie and Manny enter into a personal
management agreement.8 The agreement provides that
Manny will advise, counsel, and direct Annie in the development of her acting career. In return for Manny’s services,
Annie agrees to pay him twenty percent of her income for
five years. Both Manny and Annie enter into the agreement
with the mutual hope that Annie will be successful.
For the next six months, Manny pays for Annie’s acting
lessons and living expenses as he tries, without success, to
find a talent agent willing to represent the promising actress.
Manny also helps Annie to regain her self-esteem, telling
her, “I’ve changed my mind. You’re not going to be the next
Julia Roberts; you’re going to be bigger!”
One day, Manny calls Annie with great news: “Last
night, I had dinner with a movie-producer who is looking
for a fresh face for his next project. I told him about you,
showed him your picture, and he agreed to let you audition
agers Must Be Licensed as Talent Agents in California if They Seek Employment for
Their Clients, Even if Seeking Employment Is Only an “Incidental” Activity, California
Court of Appeal Rules; Earlier, Contrary Ruling by Another Panel of the Same Court is
Rejected as “Incorrect Dicta,” ENT. L. REP., July 1996 [hereinafter Licensing Personal
Managers].
8. See discussion infra part I.A.2 (discussing personal management agreements).
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for the starring role.” The following week, Annie auditions
and receives the lead role.
The movie is a tremendous success and Annie begins the
ascent to stardom. Suddenly, talent agents are begging her
to accept their services. No longer needing Manny’s assistance, Annie wants to escape the management agreement to
avoid paying him twenty percent of her income. Upon the
advice of her more-established actor friends, she files a complaint with California’s Labor Commission,9 requesting that
it declare her agreement with Manny void. In her complaint,
Annie alleges that Manny acted as an unlicensed talent agent
when he arranged her audition,10 because under California
law, only licensed talent agents may perform such services.11
The Labor Commissioner12 agrees with Annie’s complaint
and rules that Manny unlawfully procured employment for
Annie by securing her an audition.
As the above scenario demonstrates, if a personal manager procures employment for an artist-client without first
obtaining an agency license, the Labor Commissioner has the
authority to declare the management agreement void.13
9. See discussion infra part I.C.1 (discussing California Labor Commissioner).
10. Talent agent services include negotiating deals and procuring employment for artists. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 486; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 507; see
discussion infra part I.A.1 (describing services provided by talent agents). Under
certain circumstances, personal managers will perform talent agent services for
artist-clients. Fred Jelin, The Personal Manager Controversy: Carving the Turf, in
COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1993, at 471, 473 (PLI Pats.,
Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 359,
1993); Greenberg, supra note 2, at 490; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 507; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 483-84.
11. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 488; Jelin, supra note 10, at 477; O’Brien,
supra note 2, at 471; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510. As one commentator notes,
California law distinguishes the licensing requirements of talent agents from
personal managers: an agent must obtain a license, while a manager need not.
Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7; see discussion infra part I.A (describing
talent agents and personal managers).
12. See discussion infra part I.C.1 (discussing California Labor Commissioner).
13. See discussion infra part I.C.2.c (describing Labor Commissioner’s power
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Consequently, acting as an unlicensed talent agent can have
disastrous results;14 anyone who crosses the line of procurement and engages in regulated agency activities may
face harsh penalties.15 In Annie’s case, the Labor Commissioner would likely declare the contract void, order Manny
to return all commissions that he received from Annie, and
relieve Annie’s liability to Manny for her loans.
This scenario is a personal manager’s nightmare. To protect artists, California’s Talent Agencies Act (“TAA”)16 prohibits unlicensed individuals from procuring employment
for artists.17 Most personal managers, however, need to engage in employment procurement activities when representing their clients.18 Personal managers perform an indispensable role in developing artists’ careers,19 and this
prohibition deters individuals from functioning as personal
managers because of the potentially disastrous consequences.20 Because personal managers must engage in procurement activities to provide effective service to their clients, the prohibition against such conduct should be
removed.21 The legislature should alter California law to
protect artists and to encourage people to enter the personal
to fashion remedies under the Talent Agencies Act.
14. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 486-87; Jelin, supra 10, at 473; Greenberg, supra
note 2, at 503.
15. The penalties for engaging in agency activities without a license include
forfeiture of commissions, repayment of past fees, loss of future earnings, and
invalidation of management and collateral agreements. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at
486-87; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 503; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 474; see discussion infra part I.C.2.c (describing the penalties administered for violations of
California’s talent agency laws).
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
17. See discussion infra part I.C.2.a (describing purposes behind the TAA).
18. See discussion infra part I.A.2 (discussing why most personal managers
engage in procurement activities).
19. See discussion infra part I.A.2 (discussing unique role played by personal
manager in developing artist’s career).
20. See discussion infra part I.C.2.c (describing penalties individuals may receive for violating TAA).
21. Jelin, supra note 10, at 473; see discussion infra part III.B (advocating that
the California legislature enact a Personal Managers Act).
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management profession.22
In contrast to California law, New York law recognizes
that personal managers need to procure employment for
their clients.23 Because New York employs an incidental
booking exception,24 Manny would not be penalized for incidental procurement efforts in New York.25 Under that
state’s law, personal managers may engage in incidental
procurement efforts on behalf of their clients without obtaining an agency license.26 Commentators contend that California should take notice of New York’s “sensible” approach
to regulating personal managers and “follow suit.”27
Examining how Annie’s dispute would unfold in New
York underscores how the unregulated status of personal
managers in California continues to present the personal
manager with a dilemma.28 Current California legislation
regulates individuals who procure employment, which in
California is legally limited to talent agents.29 The conflict
arises because California law’s distinction between personal
managers and talent agents ignores reality: the day-to-day
activities of many managers may be considered procurement, and thus subject them to harsh penalties for violating
the licensing requirement.30 Personal managers often must
procure employment when representing an aspiring entertainer, in whose success the manager invests both emotion22. See discussion infra part II.B (describing possible solutions to this problem, such as an incidental booking exception and a Personal Managers Act).
23. See discussion infra part I.D.1 (describing how New York’s incidental
booking exception permits personal managers to procure employment).
24. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997).
25. See discussion infra part I.D.1 (describing New York’s incidental booking
exception).
26. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8).
27. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 509.
28. See discussion infra part I.C.1 (describing TAA’s indirect regulation of
personal managers).
29. See discussion infra part I.C.1 (discussing TAA’s regulation of individuals who procure employment for artists); see discussion infra part I.A.1 (discussing talent agent’s procurement functions for artists).
30. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 484-85.
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ally and financially.31 The personal manager must obtain an
agent’s license or act in possible violation of the TAA.32 In
light of the important and distinctive role personal managers
play in the entertainment industry, legislation is necessary to
expressly govern personal managers.
This Comment argues that California should allow personal managers to procure employment for artists when
such procurement is incidental to the manager’s managerial
responsibilities.33 Part I discusses the various duties and responsibilities of talent agents and personal managers, and
describes the regulation of personal representatives in California and New York. Part II outlines the conflict in California law concerning whether or not unlicensed personal
managers can procure employment under the TAA. Specifically, Part II discusses two cases decided in the California
Court of Appeals that have interpreted the TAA differently,
and proposes solutions to the conflict. Part II considers
amending the TAA to include an incidental booking exception and analyzes whether California should enact a Personal Managers Act (“PMA”) to expressly govern personal
managers. Part III argues that the California Legislature
should enact a PMA that incorporates an incidental booking
exception to the TAA. Drafted in this manner, the PMA
would align California law with the entertainment industry
reality. The PMA would also provide artists and managers
with a definitive statement of their obligations. Accordingly,
this Comment concludes that the California Legislature
should enact a PMA because such legislation would protect
both artists and personal managers, without compromising
31. See discussion infra part I.A.2 (setting forth personal manager’s engagement in procurement of employment when representing aspiring artists).
32. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 484-85. According to one commentator, personal managers must engage in procurement efforts. Id. Because procurement
activities require licensing as a talent agent, if a personal manager wishes to perform his job, he must obtain an agency license or act as an unlicensed agent. Id.
at 485.
33. See discussion infra part II.B.1 (describing incidental booking exception).
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the quality of representation that artists receive.
I. THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
Part I presents the background information necessary to
understand the conflict regarding whether the TAA requires
personal managers to obtain talent agency licenses before
procuring employment for artist-clients. First, this part introduces the roles and responsibilities of two key entertainment industry representatives—talent agents and personal
managers. Second, this part discusses management agreements. Third, it delineates California’s regulation of the entertainment industry. Finally, this part contrasts California
law with New York’s regulation of its entertainment industry.
A. Entertainment Industry Representatives
In the entertainment industry, professional representatives plan most business deals.34 This section examines the
roles performed by two of the most important industry
players, the talent agent and the personal manager.
1. Talent Agents
A talent agent’s primary task is to procure employment
for his client by marketing the artist’s talents and skills
throughout the entertainment industry.35 Talent agents
34. See DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTER1 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that most business deals in the
entertainment industry are undertaken by intermediaries).
35. Id. at 3 (stating that agents actively seek employment for artists in the
entertainment industry); Luaine L. Quast, Musicians, Their Representatives, and the
Agreements Between Them, in ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS
HANDBOOK 191, 192 (John D. Viera & Robert Thorne eds., 1991); Adam B. Nimoy,
Personal Managers and the California Talent Agencies Act: For Whom the Bill Toils, 2
LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 145, 147 (1982); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 478 (citing DAVID
BASKERVILLE, MUSIC BUSINESS HANDBOOK & CAREER GUIDE 150 (3d ed. 1982); Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7; Kenneth J. Abdo, Agents, Managers, and
Lawyers: A Roadmap for the Entertainment Industry, 14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 3
(1996).
TAINMENT INDUSTRIES
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function as brokers between talent-sellers and talent-buyers
by finding and negotiating offers36 of employment on behalf
of the artist.37 Additionally, an agent may serve as a buyer
of talent by securing a client for an appearance in the agent’s
own productions.38
Although talent agents are compensated for representing
artists, they rarely represent aspiring artists.39 In general,
this is because talent agents will represent an artist only if a
sufficient economic return is likely;40 not surprisingly, agents
profit more from representing established artists than from
representing the “unknowns.”41

36. See BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2; BASKERVILLE, supra note 35, at 150;
Bernard Weinraub, They Just Want a Little Respect, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, at 45; see also Abdo, supra note 35, at 3 (declaring that agents negotiate deals between
“producers, directors, writers, and actors”). The talent agent’s job is to deliver
his artists to talent buyers—producers, record companies, publishers, packagers,
promoters, and club owners— and thus find work for his client. See BIEDERMAN,
supra note 35, at 2; Abdo, supra note 35, at 3; Weinraub, supra, at 5.
37. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 478-79; see also Abdo, supra note 35, at 3; Debbie
Hanson, Connections Pay Off in the Entertainment Business, CENTRAL PENN BUS. J.,
Nov. 1, 1996, at 6 (quoting Gary Swartz, an agent, as saying, “[t]he biggest benefit
in using an agent . . . is that all of the paperwork, contract signing and details become the agent’s problem”).
38. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 479. Agents, however, must be cautious of possible violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act of
1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)).
39. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 490. For a list of Hollywood’s top talent
agencies and their respective client lists, see Elaine Dutka, Hollywood; The Big
Four, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1996, at 82.
40. Quast, supra note 35, at 203; Jim Seavor, Learn How to Find an Agent to Sell
Your Act, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Aug. 28, 1996, at 2E.
41. Quast, supra note 35, at 191; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 480; see also James
Bates, Big Movie Stars Get Big Salaries, Big Executives Whine—Big Deal, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1996, at D1 (reporting that records were shattered when motion picture
stars Sylvester Stallone, Jim Carrey, John Travolta, and Tom Hanks surpassed
the $20-million-a-film benchmark). Established artists do not necessarily need
the services of a talent agent. See generally Claudia Eller, After 15 Years, Schwarzenegger Tells ICM: ‘I Won’t Be Back,’ L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1997, at D4 (noting that
“[t]he financial loss of a star as big as Arnold Schwarzenegger, one of the highest-paid actors in the world, is significant to a talent agency, which normally receives 10% of a client’s fee on every project”); Claudia Eller, Does Kevin Costner
Need an Agent? Industry Types Weigh In, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at D6 (discussing whether established artists need agent services).
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Talent agents engage in an extremely risky practice: they
provide services to an artist, and are rewarded only when
the artist achieves some degree of success. To compensate
for this risk, agreements between artists and talent agents
usually include an exclusivity clause.42 Furthermore, a talent
agent will often seek to extend the representation of an artist
to include all forms of entertainment, thereby guaranteeing
the agent a percentage of all of the artists’ total income.43 Finally, talent agents often charge large fees, typically ranging
from ten to twenty percent of an artist’s gross earnings.44
All talent agents are regulated by state statutes and entertainment unions,45 and must obtain agency licenses under
California law.46 In order to preclude inequitable contracts,
California’s Labor Commission limits an agent’s commission

42. Quast, supra note 35, at 202-03 (claiming that exclusivity is essential to
every industry relationship). Consequently, agreements between agents and artists typically include an exclusivity clause. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 479. Talent
agents often want the exclusive right to negotiate engagements for their clients.
Stan Soocher, How to Negotiate Concert Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 20, 1995, at 5.
43. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 479; see also Quast, supra note 35, at 203 (stating
that agents wish to represent artists in all forms of artistic and commercial endeavors). Through agency agreements, talent agents can guarantee themselves a
portion of any compensation received by their clients. O’Brien, supra note 2, at
479.
44. JOSEPH TAUBMAN, IN TUNE WITH THE MUSIC BUSINESS 84 (1st ed. 1980); see
also BASKERVILLE, supra note 35, at 151; 3 ALEXANDER LINDEY, LINDEY ON
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 14: A(3) (2d ed. 1990); BIEDERMAN,
supra note 35, at 2; Abdo, supra note 35, at 3; Soocher, supra note 42, at 5; Hanson,
supra note 36, at 6.
45. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 172 (McKinney
1988 & Supp. 1997); American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Regulations Governing Agents, Rule 12-B, § XX, at 21-22 (1971); Screen Actors Guild
Agency Regulations, Amended Rule 16(g), § XI, at 18-23 (1968); Constitution ByLaws and Policy of the American Federation of Musicians of the United States
and Canada, art. XXIII, § 8, at 130 (rev. ed. 1981).
46. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (stating that “[n]o person shall engage in or
carry on the occupation of a talent agency without first procuring a license therefor from the Labor Commissioner”). California law requires that individuals engaging in agency activities have talent agency licenses, Abdo, supra note 35, at 3,
which are obtained from the state. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4. Consequently,
in California, licensed talent agents are the only individuals who may participate
in employment procurement activities. Soocher, supra note 42, at 5.
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generally to twenty-five percent of gross compensation.47 It
is through such regulations that the entertainment industry
effectively denies employment procurement services to
those who are in greatest need of such services—the unrepresented aspiring artist.48
2. Personal Managers
In contrast to a talent agent, a personal manager’s primary responsibilities include advising, counseling, and directing the development of the artist’s career.49 Personal
managers handle both the day-to-day activities and the longterm strategies of an artist’s career development.50 They arrange the artist’s interactions with other personal representatives,51 and routinely finance, or obtain financing for, com47. STAFF OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS, 1982
REGULAR SESS., STAFF ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 997 1 (1982) [hereinafter STAFF
ANALYSIS]; Donna G. Cole-Wallen, Crossing the Line: Issues Facing Entertainment
Attorneys Engaged in Secondary Occupations, 8 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 481, 521
n.218 (1986).
48. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 480.
49. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2; see, e.g., SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 491;
Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 486-87; Nimoy, supra note 35, at 147. According to
Ed Morgan of Black Park Management, “[the manager’s] ultimate goal is to help
create opportunities . . . to make and build a career.” Ray Waddell, Panel: ArtistManager Relationship Requires Much Careful Consideration, AMUSEMENT BUS., Apr.
1, 1996, at 8. Furthermore, personal managers serve as career advisors in all
business affairs, from daily management to career development. Abdo, supra
note 35, at 3.
50. Gilenson, supra note 7, at 509.
51. Jelin, supra note 10, at 475; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 482. Most artists
have a team of personal representatives working on their behalf. See Celeb PR is
All Business, Says Pros, Who Scoff at Starry Image, O’DWYER’S PR SERVS. REP., Jan.
1997, at 82 (quoting Thomas Tardio, Chairman of Shandwick’s Rogers & Cowan
entertainment unit, as saying “[e]veryone has a talent agent, a business manager,
and a personal manager, that are part of the team of deciding the next PR
move”). The personal manager’s role includes helping clients build a professional team consisting of attorneys and accountants. Waddell, supra note 49, at 8.
Consequently, established artists usually have a team of advisors: an agent, a
personal manager, a business manager, and an attorney. BIEDERMAN, supra note
35, at 1; see also Gary Greenberg, Crossing the Thin Line Between Manager and Attorney in the Entertainment Industry, 14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 7, 7 (1996) (noting that
an artist’s team of representatives usually includes a personal manager, a talent
agent, a business manager, a publicist, and an attorney). Artists may employ a
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pletion of the artist’s product.52 In addition, personal managers usually handle the artist’s finances until the artist has
earned sufficient funds to require the services of a separate
business manager.53
number of attorneys, such as a transactional attorney, a litigator, a corporate attorney, and an intellectual property attorney. Id. at 7 n.1.
52. TAUBMAN, supra note 44, at 34; SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 493; Greenberg,
supra note 2, at 490; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 509. Personal managers may own
production firms. Lisa Gubernick & Robert La Franco, “We Can Own,” FORBES,
Sept. 25, 1995, at 156 (stating that because managers do not have talent agent licenses, they are unaffected by the Justice Department ruling that separates talent
agencies and production studios).
A manager, who also produces his clients’ projects, will serve as “a strategic
planner, marketing man, accountant and babysitter.” Id. at 156. The manager
will try not to leave any aspect of his clients’ popularity unexploited. Id. Managers view their clients as “one-man industries: T shirts, records, videos, endorsements, movie deals and commercial contracts.” Id. For example, Bernie
Brillstein and Brad Grey own Brillstein-Grey, a multimillion-dollar management
and production company funded by ABC. Id. When management owns a production company, management will seek to produce their clients’ projects.
Thomas Tyrer, Talent/Production Firm In Works, ELEC. MEDIA, Sept. 11, 1995, at 40
(quoting Scott Siegler, former president of Columbia Pictures Television and
partner in MediaFour, a talent management and production firm, “[i]t’s a logical
extension in managing talent to be able to take it all the way through the fruition
of the production rather than just lead them to the door”). In addition, artists
benefit from management firms that can also produce. Id. at 40. Furthermore,
agents are frustrated because they are not allowed to produce. Gubernick & La
Franco, supra, at 156.
53. Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 490; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at
30 (noting that a business manager is not required early in an artist’s career).
Generally, an accountant or lawyer may serve as the business manager. SIEGEL I,
supra note 7, at 486; Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 490; Ted Johnson, VARIETY,
Sept. 16, 1996, at 87. Typically, the business manager, however, is a certified
public accountant. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2; Abdo, supra note 35, at 3;
Greenberg, supra note 51, at 7.
Celebrity business managers receive as much as five percent of a client’s income, while conventional financial advisors perform similar services for commissions of one percent. See BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2; Johnson, supra, at 87.
Competition from personal bankers has forced some business managers to lower
their rates or even accept hourly payments. Id. Nevertheless, business managers
feel that higher fees are justified because they provide a more personal level of
service. Id. Business managers may pay personal bills, help pick out new cars,
and advise clients on which schools their children should attend. Id.; see also
BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2 (noting that business manager’s functions include
simple accounting services, paying the client’s bills, advising on investments,
running tours, and other complicated matters). Furthermore, business managers
are very close with clients and their families. Johnson, supra, at 87 (quoting busi-
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Artists usually employ personal managers in addition to
talent agents.54 While personal managers do provide aspiring artists with much needed business acumen and industry
contacts,55 industry newcomers engage personal managers
before talent agents only because they are unable to find talent agents willing to represent them.56 Additionally, personal managers often suggest that their knowledge and contacts can improve the artist’s chances for success,57 and
might even imply that their guidance will lead the artist to
stardom.58
The personal manager differs from the talent agent because a personal manager’s duties include both business and
personal concerns.59 Personal managers, speculating on the
artists’ success, frequently lend their aspiring clients
money,60 and often become the artists’ friends and confiness manager, Barbara Carswell, as saying, “I’ve been in the hospital room when
a client died . . . I went with the family to help pick out the coffin. I don’t know
how much closer you can get”). Consequently, business managers are privy to
the most intimate details of their clients’ financial lives. BIEDERMAN, supra note
35, at 41; see generally ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 990
(2d Cir. 1983) (discussing business managers’ strong fiduciary obligations to
their clients).
54. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 481; Greenberg, supra note 51, at 7; John Brodie
& Kathleen O’Steen, Antsy Agents Make Mutant Managers, VARIETY, Mar. 20, 1995,
at 1.
55. In the early stages of an artist’s career, the manager must educate the
artist about the entertainment industry. Waddell, supra note 49, at 8. Usually,
artists do not understand how their careers are going to develop. Id.
56. LINDEY, supra note 44, § 14:D(2); Quast, supra note 35, at 191 (stating that
personal managers are the only representatives that an aspiring musician can afford to hire); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 481 (noting that talent agents rarely represent aspiring artists).
57. LINDEY, supra note 44, § 14:D(2); O’Brien, supra note 2, at 481.
58. LINDEY, supra note 44, § 14:D(2); Michael McLeod, Kid, I’m Gonna Make
You a Star; In Some Cases, That Proves To Be True. In Others, It’s Just a Line. Take a
Peek Behind The Glamour and Glitz, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Apr. 7, 1996, at 6.
59. Jelin, supra note 10, at 475; Waddell, supra note 49, at 8; Gilenson, supra
note 7, at 508; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 2 (explaining that managers
get intimately involved with career development and creating their client’s public image); Ann A. Pantoga, Personal Managers Must Be Licensed if They Procure
Employment for Artist, 6 J. ART & ENT. L. 327 (1996) (stating that personal managers deal with both personal and business matters).
60. Quast, supra note 35, at 198. Managers may invest their own money into
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dants.61 In addition, personal managers might nurture the
artists’ personal relationships,62 receive telephone calls at
any time,63 or even pick up the artists’ laundry.64 By organizing their clients’ business and personal lives, personal
managers free the artists from day-to-day concerns, allowing
them to concentrate on creative tasks.65 Thus, the personal
manager plays a unique role in an artist’s development and
success.66
B. Management Agreements
Management agreements set forth the personal manager’s obligations to the artist.67 The agreements are usually
an act during the early stages of the client’s career. Waddell, supra note 49, at 8.
Managers may also speculate on an artist’s success by “partnering with the personality in making movies, records or TV shows.” Gubernick & La Franco, supra
note 52, at 156.
61. Personal managers may become so close, in fact, that they serve as a client’s alter ego. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 482 (citing Quast, supra note 35, at 198);
Waddell, supra note 49, at 8 (quoting Paula Sartorious of Side One Management,
as stating that “[a] manager is with an artist every single day, almost like a marriage . . . the artist has to ask himself, ‘Can I deal with this person every day, can
I trust this person?’”).
62. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 482 (citing Quast, supra note 35, at 198).
63. See WAYNE WADHAMS, SOUND ADVICE: THE MUSICIAN’S GUIDE TO THE
RECORD INDUSTRY 76 (1990) (relating a manager’s story about a phone call from
the Georgia State Police after his artist-client was picked up “for throwing firecrackers out the back of [a] van at 6: 00 a.m. while doing 90 mph on Route 95
South”); see also Greenberg, supra note 51, at 7 (noting that personal management
can be a thankless job occupied by late night phone calls and detail-oriented
days).
64. Baskerville, supra note 35, at 154.
65. Personal managers give their clients time to be artists. O’Brien, supra
note 2, at 483.
66. Waddell, supra note 49, at 8; see also Greenberg, supra note 51, at 8.
67. See Quast, supra note 35, at 207. Commonly offered services include:
(1) advice and counsel in the selection of literary, artistic, and musical
material;
(2) advice and counsel in publicity, public relations, and advertising;
(3) advice and counsel in choosing a proper format to showcase the artist’s talents and in determining mood, style, setting, etc.;
(4) advice and counsel in selecting artistic collaborative talent;
(5) advice and counsel with regard to general practices in the entertainment industry as a whole;
(6) advice and counsel concerning the selection and direction of agents,
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for a term of three to five years,68 and typically contain exclusivity clauses similar to those found in agency contracts.69
Personal managers usually earn a commission of ten to
fifty percent of the artist’s gross receipts, as compared to the
standard ten percent received by talent agents.70 They justify their high fees by enduring greater risks than talent
agents.71 Personal managers invest a considerable amount
of time and money in the long-term development of an unknown artist’s career, and therefore charge higher fees to
cover their expenses.72
Neither statutory nor entertainment-union regulations
expressly govern the personal manager’s activities and compensation.73 By procuring employment, however, personal
business managers, and other management personnel.
Id.; see also SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 491-93 (stating that personal managers are
expected to advise the artist in all facets of the artist’s career, including: selecting material, selecting costumes, selecting personnel, selecting the proper vehicle, personal management, representation with third parties, and providing
funds); Greenberg, supra note 51, at 7 (stating that standard management agreements require the manager to advise and counsel the artist concerning the general practices in the entertainment industry with regard to compensation and
privileges, and in connection with negotiating agreements); Id. at 7 n.5 (suggesting that other services required by a typical management agreement are to advise and counsel: (1) in the selection of literary, artistic, and musical material; (2)
in matters regarding publicity; (3) with respect to adopting a proper format for
presenting the artist’s talent; (4) in selecting artistic talent to accompany the artist’s presentation; (5) with respect to selecting talent agencies and any other representatives engaged to counsel and advise the artist and to seek and procure
employment engagements for the artist; and (6) to the extent permitted by law,
to obtain employment for the artist as a recording artist).
68. Waddell, supra note 49, at 8. However, a recent trend in the recording
industry is to base contract length on album cycles. Id.
69. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 482; see discussion supra part I.A.1 (discussing
the artist-agent relationship). For examples of management agreements, see
LINDEY, supra note 44, § 14: D-2.01; SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 505-72. Typically, the
management agreement emphasizes the personal manager’s interests. LINDEY,
supra note 44, § 14:D(2); Gilenson, supra note 7, at 503-04.
70. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 1; see, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 51, at
8; Quast, supra note 35, at 199; Waddell, supra note 49, at 8; Abdo, supra note 35,
at 3.
71. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 483.
72. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 1; Quast, supra note 35, at 199.
73. Abdo, supra note 35, at 4; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (stating
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managers may become subject to the standards that govern
talent agents because those rules regulate employment procurement activities.74 As a result, to avoid the appearance of
acting as an unlicensed talent agent, many personal management contracts include clauses explicitly stating that they
will not procure employment.75
Personal managers insist that the restriction against their
procuring employment for clients ignores an entertainment
industry reality: that “any personal manager worth his or
her commission partakes in some manner in procuring or attempting to procure employment for his or her clients.”76
Thus, personal managers in California face a dilemma: they
can continue unlicensed procurement activities and risk being penalized by the Labor Commissioner,77 or they can obtain talent-agency licenses and subject themselves to state
and union regulation.78
C. Entertainment Industry Regulation in California
In California, the entertainment industry constitutes a
significant part of the state’s economy.79 To protect the interests of those involved in the industry, the California legislature has created a highly detailed regulatory system.80
Additionally, the entertainment unions and guilds also regulate the industry to protect their artist-members.81 This section examines how both California’s TAA and the enterthat the California statute does not expressly grant jurisdiction over unlicensed
agents).
74. See BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (noting that the Labor Commission
has jurisdiction over individuals performing agency functions); Abdo, supra note
35, at 4 (stating that unlicensed representatives are subject to regulation).
75. Gilenson, supra note 7, at 511.
76. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 483-84; see also Abdo, supra note 35, at 3 (acknowledging that managers must procure employment for clients).
77. See BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4 (explaining that acting as an unlicensed agent can lead to severe consequences).
78. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 484.
79. Id. at 472.
80. BIEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 12.
81. See id. at 25; Abdo, supra note 35, at 4.
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tainment guilds and unions regulate the entertainment industry. It concludes with an examination of the California
cases that have laid the foundation for the controversy over
procuring employment.
1. California’s Talent Agencies Act
California regulates the entertainment industry through
the TAA, a complex remedial statute.82 This sub-section examines the purpose and legislative history of the TAA and
describes how the TAA regulates the industry. Additionally, it discusses the remedies that may be administered
when a violation occurs. This sub-section concludes with an
analysis of the TAA’s ambiguous language.
a. Purpose and Legislative History
The California legislature enacted the TAA to protect artists seeking employment in California’s entertainment industry from the unscrupulous practices of agents.83 The issue of whether artists need protection arose when the
California legislature learned that talent agents were engaging in inappropriate actions, such as sending female artists
to houses of prostitution,84 sending artists to dangerous locations, arranging for minors to work in bars, and splitting fees
with owners or managers of the venues that booked their
artists.85 These actions prompted remedial legislation, in the
82. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.00-.47; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 12
(suggesting that California has a detailed legislative system of regulation).
83. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 493 (citing Licensing and Regulation of Artists
Managers, Personal Managers, and Musicians Booking Agencies: Hearings Before the
California Legislature Senate Comm. on Industrial Relations 222 (1975) [hereinafter
Hearings] (testimony of Albert Reyff, Asst. State Labor Comm’r)); Jelin, supra
note 10, at 476; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4; Miles E. Locker, Enforcement of the California Talent Agencies Act: The Procedures of the Labor Commissioner,
14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 11, 30 (1996); Pantoga, supra note 50, at 327.
84. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 493 (citing Hearings, supra note 83, at 28-29 (testimony of Roger Davis, First Vice Pres. of the Artists’ Managers Guild)).
85. Quast, supra note 35, at 193; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 480. While the rationale for restricting an agent’s ability to send artists to dangerous places or to
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form of an amendment to the Private Employment Agencies
Law of 1913,86 that regulated talent agents87 and prohibited
them from engaging in such activities.88
Through this amendment, talent agents were brought
under the Labor Commissioner’s jurisdiction.89 In 1959, the
legislature enacted a new chapter of the Labor Code unique
to the issues and concerns related to artists’ representatives—the Artists’ Managers Act.90 In 1978, the Artists’
Managers Act became the TAA.91
In 1982, the legislature added three significant amendments to the TAA,92 subject to “sunset provisions,”93
send minors to bars is obvious, further explanation of “fee splitting” may be necessary to show the justification for its prohibition. Fee splitting occurs when an
agent pays money to an employer of talent in exchange for the employer’s promise to hire only artists represented by that agent. Hearings, supra note 83, at A-6
(statement of Walter L.M. Lorimer, an attorney who participated in drafting the
Artists Managers Bill in 1959). The agent books his artists into the employer’s
venue, collects a commission from the artist, and turns over part of the commission to the employer. Id.
86. 1913 Cal. Stat. 515, amended by 1923 Cal. Stat. 936.
87. The TAA is an example of interest-group politics trumping legislative
integrity. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 493 n.138. The TAA progressed to its present
form in slow stages directed by interested parties, bargained amendments, and
industry debate. Id.
88. Id. at 493.
89. Id. at 493-94. The TAA originated with the Artists’ Managers Act of
1943, which allowed personal managers to procure employment for artists as
part of their duties as an adviser and counselor. Steinberg & Hazzard, supra note
7, at B7.
90. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 494. Talent agents lobbied for the changes,
complaining that they were subject to rules not specifically promulgated to regulate them. Id. (citing Letter from John F. Henning, Director of the California Department of Industrial Relation, to Julian Beck, Legislative Secretary, Governor’s
Office (May 28, 1959)).
91. Id. In contrast to the Artists’ Managers Act, the TAA “focuses on persons engaged in the occupation of procuring employment or engagements for an
artist.” Steinberg & Hazzard, supra note 7, at B7.
92. The significant changes benefited personal managers. Jelin, supra note
10, at 480.
93. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 494; see also Richard L. Feller, California’s Revised
Talent Agencies Act: Fine-Tuning the Regulation of Employment Procurement in the
Entertainment Industry, 5 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 3 (1986) (stating that sunset provisions were supposed to delete the three major modifications made to the TAA).
“Sunset provisions” set legislation to terminate on a specified date unless rein-
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changed the TAA in three significant ways: (1) allowing
unlicensed individuals to act in concert with, and at the request of, licensed talent agents in negotiating employment
contracts;94 (2) exempting the procurement of recording contracts from regulation;95 and (3) establishing a one-year statute of limitations.96 The sunset provisions were to terminate
on January 1, 1986.97
In addition, the amendments created the California Entertainment Commission (“Entertainment Commission”)98 to
study the entertainment industry and recommend a model
regulatory bill to the legislature.99 After two years of deliberation,100 the Entertainment Commission recommended the
stated by the legislature. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1436 (6th ed. 1990).
94. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d); see, e.g., BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12;
Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 514; Feller, supra note 92, at
4. This exception recognizes that “personal managers are prevalent in the recording industry.” Jelin, supra note 10, at 480.
95. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a); see, e.g., BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (noting that, under amendments to the TAA, negotiating a recording contract does
not constitute performance of agency functions); Jelin, supra note 10, at 480;
Gilenson, supra note 7, at 513; Feller, supra note 92, at 4.
96. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(c); see, e.g., BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12
(noting that amendments to the TAA established a one-year statue of limitations); Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; Feller, supra note 92, at 4.
97. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 494; Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; Feller, supra note
92, at 3. The legislature did not allow these provisions to terminate. O’Brien,
supra note 2, at 495.
98. The Entertainment Commission was composed of 10 individuals: artists
Ed Asner, John Forsythe, and Cicely Tyson; talent agents Jeffrey Berg, Roger
Davis, and Richard Rosenberg; personal managers Bob Finklestein, Patricia
McQueeney, and Larry Thompson; and the State Labor Commissioner C. Robert
Simpson, Jr. Id. at 495 n.148 (citing REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA ENTERTAINMENT
COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 2 (1985) [hereinafter ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT] (submitted pursuant to Act of Aug. 31, 1982, ch.
682, § 6, 1982 Cal. Stat. 2814, 2816, repealed by Act of July 17, 1984, ch. 553, 1984
Cal. Stat. 2185 (effective Jan. 1, 1986)); see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 489;
Jelin, supra note 10, at 481-82; Feller, supra note 92, at 3.
99. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 494-95; Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; Greenberg,
supra note 2, at 488; Locker, supra note 83, at 29; Feller, supra note 92, at 3; Pantoga, supra note 50, at 328.
100. The Entertainment Commission examined these issues:
(1) Can unlicensed persons engage in procurement activities for artists?
[No.]
(2) Should any changes be made to the Act’s exception for persons pro-
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elimination of the sunset provisions and the permanent
adoption of all three amendments.101 The Entertainment
Commission interpreted the TAA as prohibiting personal
managers from seeking or procuring employment for artists
without a talent-agent license.102 Furthermore, the Entertainment Commission determined that the TAA applies to
any person who engages in procurement activity for an artist.103 According to the Entertainment Commission’s Report,
anyone who solicits or procures employment for an artist is
subject to dispute resolution by the Labor Commissioner.104
In 1986, the legislature adopted the Entertainment Commission’s recommendations.105 No major changes to the TAA
curing recording contracts for artists? [No.]
(3) Should the Act contain criminal sanctions? [No.]
(4) Should the Act’s sunset provisions be removed? [Yes.]
(5) Should the Act be repealed and/or should there be a separate act for
personal managers? [No.]
(6) Should any other changes be made to the Act? [The Commission
recommended several “administrative” changes.]
O’Brien, supra note 2 at 495 n.149 (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 98, at 5); Jelin, supra note 10, at 482-83.
101. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 495; Jelin, supra note 10, at 483.
102. ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 6; Cole-Wallen,
supra note 47, at 488; Pantoga, supra note 50, at 328.
103. The Entertainment Commission stated:
[T]hat the prohibitions of the Act over the activities of anyone procuring
employment for an artist without being licensed as a talent agent must
remain, as they are intended to be, total . . . . [O]ne either is, or is not,
licensed as a talent agent, and, if not so licensed, one cannot expect to
engage, with impunity, in any activity relating to the services which a
talent agent is licensed to render.
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 495 (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 98, at 20); see also Feller, supra note 92, at 3 (stating that the Entertainment
Commission declared that unlicensed individuals cannot procure employment);
Pantoga, supra note 50, at 328 (reporting that the Entertainment Commission
concluded that an agency license is required to perform any procurement activity).
104. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 495-96. The Labor Commissioner’s determinations espouse similar views. Id.
105. Id. at 495; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (acknowledging that,
in 1986, the California legislature amended the TAA to provide: (1) the recording contract exception; (2) the exception for working in concert with licensed
talent agents; and (3) the one-year statute of limitations); Feller, supra note 92, at
3 (noting that in 1986, the legislature adopted all of the Entertainment Commis-
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have been adopted since then.106
Two commentators, Neville Johnson and Daniel Lang,
argue that, because personal managers do not primarily procure employment, the TAA was not intended to regulate
such individuals.107 They rely on statutory definitions and
syntactical uses to infer the legislative intent of the TAA.108
They contend that the California legislature intended to
“regulate only those whose primary purpose and function is
the procuring of employment for artists.”109 The Labor
Commissioner, however, has interpreted the TAA to include
any attempt to procure employment.110
b. Regulatory Scheme
The TAA defines the role of talent agents in the entertainment industry,111 and provides for the comprehensive
regulation of talent agents who procure employment for artists.112 Specifically, section 1700.4(a) of the TAA defines a
sion’s recommendations).
106. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 495.
107. Neville L. Johnson & Daniel W. Lang, The Personal Manager in the California Entertainment Industry, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 388 (1979).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 510; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 495-96.
111. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a); BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 13. The TAA
defines the necessary terms. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.0-.4. Article 1 of the
TAA defines the following terms: person, engagements, fee, license, licensee,
talent agency, and artist. Id.
112. According to one commentator:
Sections 1700 to 1700.4 are the definitional provisions. Section 1700.5
compels all individuals or organizations who engage in procurement
activities to obtain a license from the Labor Commissioner. Sections
1700.6 through 1700.22 set forth particular licensing procedures, from
the completion of an application to a surety bond requirement. Sections
1700.23 to 1700.41 govern the business affairs of talent agents, mandating Labor Commission approval of form agreements between agents
and artists and prohibiting certain types of conduct. Section 1700.44(a)
gives the Labor Commissioner original Jurisdiction over disputes arising under the Act; he or she may hear all such controversies subject to a
one-year statute of limitations and the right to appeal de novo to the
superior court.
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (noting that
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talent agent as a person engaged in the occupation of procuring employment for artists.113 Furthermore, Article 2 of the
TAA describes the licensing procedures,114 and expressly reCalifornia’s legislative regulatory scheme governing talent agents is extremely
detailed); Feller, supra note 92, at 28 (suggesting that California is the state with
the most developed system of regulating employment procurement in the entertainment industry).
113. Section 1700.4(a) of the TAA provides:
Talent agency means a person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists, except that the activities of procuring, offering, or promising to procure recording contracts
for an artist or artists shall not of itself subject a person or corporation to
regulation and licensing under this chapter. Talent agencies may, in
addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of their professional careers.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a).
114. Id. §§ 1700.6-.22. Anyone seeking a new license or the renewal of an
existing license must file a written application, and license renewal is required
every year. Id. §§ 1700.6, 1700.10. While processing an application, the Labor
Commissioner has discretion to issue a temporary license valid for up to ninety
days. Locker, supra note 83, at 11. The Labor Commissioner has the power to
revoke a temporary license. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.14.
Under Labor Code section 1700.8, the Labor Commissioner must give notice
of the grounds for denying an application and must provide an opportunity for a
hearing. Id. § 1700.8. The Labor Commissioner initiates the denial proceedings
by serving the applicant with a statement of issues, providing the factual and legal basis for the denial. Locker, supra note 83, at 11. Applicants request a hearing to contest a denial by filing a notice of defense within fifteen days after receiving the statement of issues. Id. Although the Labor Commissioner presents
its case first, the burden of proof is on the applicant to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he meets the qualifications for receiving a license. Id.
An administrative law judge conducts the hearing and issues a proposed decision. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 11517, 11518. The Labor Commissioner has discretion to
accept or reject the proposed decision. Id. § 11517. By filing a timely petition for
writ of administrative mandate, the applicant can obtain judicial review of the
Labor Commissioner’s final decision. Locker, supra note 83, at 12.
Under section 1700.21 of the TAA, the Labor Commissioner has the authority
to revoke or suspend a talent agency license on any of the following grounds: (1)
violation or failure to comply with the TAA; (2) lacking good moral character; (3)
change of circumstances since the license was issued; or (4) a material misrepresentation or false statement in the application. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.21. Under
section 1700.22 of the TAA, the provisions of the Administrative Hearings Act
apply to suspension and revocation proceedings. Id. § 1700.22. In contrast to
denial proceedings, in revocation or suspension proceedings, the Labor Commissioner has the burden of proof. Locker, supra note 83, at 12. There are no other
procedural differences between suspension and denial proceedings. Id. After
having its license revoked, a talent agency is prohibited from applying for an-
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quires representatives who procure employment for artists
to obtain an agent’s license,115 for which they must file a
written application.116 After receiving an application, the
Labor Commissioner investigates the applicant’s character
and the nature of the talent agency.117 Article 2 also grants
the Labor Commissioner has discretion to deny any application.118
Article 3 regulates talent agents’ business activities,119 requiring all talent agents to: (1) obtain the Labor Commissioner’s approval of all form contracts; (2) maintain a separate trust fund account for funds belonging to clients; (3)
retain records for the client; (4) refrain from making misleading statements concerning an artist’s employment; and (5)
avoid certain payment practices.120 Under section 1700.23,
all talent agents must obtain Labor Commissioner approval
of form contracts.121 The Labor Commissioner will withhold
approval of any contract form that is unfair, unjust, or opother license for three years after the final decision upholding the revocation.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 11506.
115. Id. § 1700.5. Labor Code section 1700.5 provides: “No person shall engage in or carry on the occupation of a talent agency without first procuring a
license therefor from the Labor Commissioner.” Id.
116. Id. § 1700.6.
117. Id. § 1700.7.
118. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.8.
119. Id. §§ 1700.23-.41. Labor Code section 1700.23 requires every talent
agency to obtain the Labor Commissioner’s approval for form contracts utilized
by the agency. Id. § 1700.23. Generally, the Labor Commissioner will disapprove any provision that creates a conflict of interest between the talent agency
and the artist, or that diminishes the protection afforded by the TAA. Locker,
supra note 83, at 12. The Labor Commissioner must approve the proposed contract form before the issuance of a talent agency license. Id. Labor Code section
1700.24 requires all agents to file a fee schedule with the Labor Commissioner.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.24. Furthermore, the fee schedule must be filed before an
agency license is issued. Locker, supra note 83, at 12. The Labor Commissioner
does not allow any registration fee, defined at Labor Code section 1700.2(b) as
any charge for registering or listing an artist for employment in the entertainment industry, letter writing, photographs, film strips, video tapes, or other reproductions of the artist. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.2(b).
120. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 442 n.9 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (citing CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.23-.41).
121. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23.
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pressive to the artist.122 Under section 1700.26, talent agents
must maintain records of: (1) the names and addresses of all
of their clients; (2) the amount of fees received from each client; (3) the engagements secured on behalf of each client;
and (4) the amount of compensation received by each client.123
Finally, the TAA grants the Labor Commissioner the authority to resolve disputes arising under the TAA.124 The
Labor Commissioner has original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and determine all controversies regarding potential
violations of the TAA.125 Because the Commissioner’s authority extends to unlicensed individuals,126 personal managers cannot escape the Labor Commission’s jurisdiction by
failing to obtain a license or through any other action.127
122. Locker, supra note 83, at 12.
123. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.26. Under Labor Code section 1700.27, every talent agency must allow the Labor Commissioner to inspect the records and to
give the Labor Commissioner copies of these records if requested. Id. § 1700.27.
124. Id. § 1700.44(a). Under Labor Code section 1700.44, the Labor Commissioner has exclusive jurisdiction to determine controversies that arise under the
TAA. Id. The Labor Commissioner’s jurisdiction is limited by Labor Code section 1700.45, which allows the parties to refer contractual disputes to an arbitrator in limited circumstances. Id. § 1700.45.
125. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44; see, e.g., Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 364, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that in cases arising under the TAA,
the Labor Commissioner has original jurisdiction to the exclusion of the superior
court); Martin D. Singer, Regulation of Talent Agents: The Richard Pryor Determination, in 1983 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 255, 255 (Michael Meyer & John D. Viera eds., 1983); Feller, supra note 92, at 27 (citing CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1700.44).
126. Section 1700.44(a) applies to all disputes between artists and individuals allegedly performing talent-agency services, regardless of whether the
charged party has a license. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487 (citing Singer, supra
note 125, at 255 (explaining that the Labor Commissioner has jurisdiction over
individuals who perform talent agency services whether or not they are licensed). Cases have established that individuals operating in violation of the
TAA are exposed to statutory penalties regardless of whether they are licensed
or not, Abdo, supra note 35, at 4 (citing Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr.
364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)), because the TAA regulates both licensed and unlicensed agents. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4; Feller, supra note 92, at 27 (citing
Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364).
127. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4 (stating that the TAA applies to any person engaged in seeking employment for an
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The TAA contains two exceptions to the licensing requirement.128 First, individuals who procure recording contracts for artists need not obtain talent agency licenses.129
This exception recognizes that personal managers, rather
than talent agents, customarily negotiate recording contracts
for their artist-clients.130 Second, the TAA provides an exception for negotiating an employment contract when acting
in concert with, and at the request of, a licensed talent
agency.131 This exception only applies when licensed talent
agents cooperate with unlicensed representatives to negotiate employment contracts.132 It “creates the closest thing to a
safe harbor” for managers engaged in employment negotiations.133 Although some agents cooperate by giving personal
managers letters confirming that the manager is authorized
to work on specific deals for mutual clients, most agencies
have a policy against issuing such letters.134
c. Remedies for Violations of the TAA
In addition to original and exclusive jurisdiction, the Laartist).
128. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.4(a), 1700.44(d); BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 13;
Gilenson, supra note 7, at 513; Abdo, supra note 35, at 4; Feller, supra note 92, at 4.
129. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a); see, e.g., BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12;
Siegel II, supra note 7, at 143; Jelin, supra note 10, at 480; Gilenson, supra note 7, at
513; Abdo, supra note 35, at 4; Feller, supra note 92, at 4.
130. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 500; see, e.g., Jelin, supra note 10, at 480 (stating
that personal managers dominate the recording industry); Gilenson, supra note 7,
at 513; Feller, supra note 92, at 4.
131. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d).
132. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12; see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 481 (stating that this exception creates an uneasy alliance between agents and managers).
133. Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; see also Gilenson, supra note 7, at 514 (acknowledging that this exception recognizes that personal managers often work
with talent agents to determine the best opportunities for their clients); Feller,
supra note 92, at 4 (stating that personal managers are safe when representing a
performer who can also afford the services of a licensed talent agent who is willing to cooperate with the manager).
134. Jelin, supra note 10, at 481; see also O’Brien, supra note 2, at 500; Feller,
supra note 92, at 4 (suggesting that personal managers seeking to come within
this exception should obtain documentation of the talent agent’s request for the
manager to work in conjunction on the particular project).
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bor Commissioner has the authority to enforce the TAA and
to fashion remedies for violations.135 Upon determining that
an unlicensed individual has conducted talent agent services, the Labor Commissioner will invalidate any contract
between the unlicensed individual and the artist.136 The Labor Commissioner may also decide that the talent agent has
surrendered his or her right to further fees or commissions,137 that the artist is no longer liable for loans received
from the agent to promote the artist’s career,138 and that the
artist is entitled to receive funds already paid to the unlicensed representative.139 On rare occasions, the Commissioner may find that the agent has a right to some or all
compensation based on quantum meruit.140 If the Commissioner voids the management agreement, the void agreement will serve to invalidate any collateral agreements or
contracts entered into by the parties.141 The Labor Commissioner thus has the power to divest unlicensed individuals of
both past and future compensation.142
The Labor Commissioner’s power to remedy violations
of the TAA provides artists with significant protection from
135. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 491.
136. If the Labor Commissioner determines that an unlicensed individual
acted as a talent agent, any agreement between the artists and the unlicensed talent agent will be declared void. ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
98, at 17-18; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 503; Jelin, supra note 10, at 477.
137. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 503.
138. Id.
139. Id.; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 491 (citing Singer, supra note 125, at 258);
see also Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7 (stating that managers may be
forced to return commissions previously received from the client).
140. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 491 (citing Singer, supra note 125, at 258); see
also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 505 (claiming that an unlicensed talent agent,
who violated the TAA but did not engage in bad faith dealings, should receive
an offset against the TAA’s damages for the value of the services rendered).
“Quantum meruit” means “as much as deserved.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 93, at 1243. It is an equitable doctrine that implies a promise to pay a
reasonable amount for benefits received when unjust enrichment would otherwise occur. Id.
141. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 503; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 491.
142. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 503; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 491.
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individuals who unlawfully function as talent agents.143
Most artists do not employ the TAA for protection; rather,
they utilize the TAA to reclaim fees paid to personal representatives.144 The remedies afforded by the TAA, however,
are not self-enforcing.145 To initiate an action with the Labor
Commission, an artist must file a complaint146—a procedure
which commentators have strongly criticized.147 Notwithstanding this criticism, the TAA has become both a powerful
tool for artists seeking to void agreements, and a source of
financial and professional misfortune for unlicensed individuals.148
d. Ambiguous Language in the TAA
In California, an individual who procures employment
for an artist is deemed to be a talent agent.149 Under the
TAA, only talent agents are permitted to procure employ143. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 507; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492; see also
Locker, supra note 83, at 30 (stating that the TAA provides artists and the Labor
Commissioner with a powerful tool for remedying abuses that remain in the entertainment industry).
144. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492. Some artists try to use the TAA to avoid
paying their manager past fees; other artists use the TAA to avoid paying their
manager a share of future income. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 507 (suggesting
that the most significant result of invalidating all management agreements for a
violation of the TAA is that it eliminates the manager’s claim to any share of the
artist’s future success).
145. Id. at 496; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492; Locker, supra note 83, at 14.
146. Unless a complaint is filed, the Labor Commission rarely initiates action to enforce the TAA. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 496; Cole-Wallen, supra note
47, at 516; Locker, supra note 83, at 14. There are two types of complaints: (1)
artists’ alleging unlicensed procurement activities, and (2) talent agents’ seeking
to recover fees. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 496; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492.
147. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492.
148. Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 507 (stating that an unlicensed
talent agent may expect severe punishment for even inconsequential involvement in procurement activities when brought before the Labor Commissioner);
Locker, supra note 83, at 30.
149. An individual who performs procurement activities is legally defined
as a talent agent. ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 20; see,
e.g., Greenberg, supra note 2, at 488 (noting that California law defines a talent
agent as a person who procures employment for an artist); Jelin, supra note 10, at
476; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510.
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ment for artists.150 Therefore, participation in procurement
activities will subject an individual to the TAA’s restrictions.151 Consequently, to establish a violation of the TAA,
an individual must have engaged in unlicensed procurement
activities on behalf of an artist.152
Some commentators have argued that the TAA contains
a significant ambiguity because the legislature neglected to
define the term “procurement.”153 These commentators insist that, because the term procurement is unclear, reasonable people are uncertain whether particular actions violate
the TAA.154 Consequently, commentators contend that unlicensed personal managers are unfairly exposed to potential
liability.155
To determine the meaning of procurement, one must
look primarily to the Labor Commissioner determinations156
150. Under the TAA, a talent agency is defined as a person or corporation
who procures employment for an artist. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a); Jelin, supra
note 10, at 476; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 488; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510.
151. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 4; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 502; Jelin,
supra note 10, at 476; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 511.
152. Jelin, supra note 10, at 476; Greenberg, supra note 7, at 501; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 512; Locker, supra note 83, at 14.
153. Jelin, supra note 10, at 477; Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510; O’Brien, supra
note 2, at 497.
154. Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497; Feller, supra
note 92, at 4.
155. The failure to define the term procurement unfairly subjects unlicensed
individuals to the TAA’s potentially harsh remedies. Greenberg, supra note 2, at
507; see, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497; Feller, supra note 92, at 4.
156. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497. The Labor Commissioner hears TAA controversies in offices throughout California. Id. All determinations are returned
to the central office in San Francisco, and are available upon request. Id. However, the records are not well organized, and there is a considerable period of
time between the institution of a controversy and its resolution. Id. at 497 n.164
(citing Karen A. Julian, Personal Manager or Talent Agent? A Summary of Recent
California Commission Findings in Regulation of Entertainers’ Representatives, in 1983
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 315. Between 1985 and early 1990, 165 TAA controversies appear to have been initiated.
Id. (citing Julian, supra, at 315). This represents over a 500% increase from the
period of December 1977 to September 1983. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497 n.164
(citing Julian, supra, at 315). For unreported decisions of the California Labor
Commissioner, see Richard Feller, Artist v. Manager v. Agent v. Labor Commis-
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and the California Entertainment Commission’s Report.157
Unfortunately, however, the Labor Commissioner does not
report its decisions.158 Consequently, members of the California entertainment industry often have difficulty understanding the meaning of the term procurement. Although
the Commission has identified some specific activities as
constituting procurement,159 hearing officers160 have failed to
provide the public with a consistent definition.161
Both the Labor Commissioner and the courts have
broadly interpreted the term “procurement” to include any
attempt to solicit employment for an artist.162 This definition
has been interpreted to include introducing artists to producers or directors,163 initiating contacts with employers,164
furthering an offer for a artist-client,165 or negotiating employment contracts.166 Despite this attempted clarification,
sioner—Developments in the Regulation of Entertainers’ Representatives, Syllabus for
the Symposium of the Beverly Hills Bar Association, Nov. 12, 1983; Richard
Feller, Artist v. Manager Revisited—Further Developments in the Regulation of Entertainers’ Representatives, Syllabus for the Symposium of the Beverly Hills Bar Association, June 1, 1985.
157. ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 6-12.
158. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497; see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 477 (stating
that Labor Commissioner decisions have no precedential value because they are
unreported).
159. For a list of activities that the Labor Commissioner has recognized as
constituting “procurement,” see infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
160. Hearing officers are usually attorneys from the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497 n.164. Hearing officers, otherwise known as administrative law judges, are assigned by the State Office of
Administrative Hearings. Locker, supra note 83, at 11-12.
161. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497-98; see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 477 (noting that cases have not established a consistent definition of procurement).
162. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 498; see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 501
(suggesting that the Labor Commissioner has taken a literal approach to the
TAA’s definition of a talent agent); Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510-11 (stating that
personal managers are infringing on the agent’s role by promising or attempting
to procure employment).
163. See, e.g., Derek v. Callan, No. TAC 18-80 (Cal. Labor Comm’r 1982).
164. See, e.g., Pryor v. Franklin, No. TAC 17 MP 114 (Cal. Labor Comm’r
1982).
165. See, e.g., Kearney v. Singer, No. MP 429, AM 211 MC (Cal. Labor
Comm’r 1978).
166. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Wolf, No. TAC 29-79 (Cal. Labor Comm’r 1981).
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commentators argue that the term is still vague,167 and urge
the legislature to take appropriate steps to remove the ambiguity of the determinative language in the TAA.168
Larry Thompson, a personal manager and member of the
California Entertainment Commission,169 has advocated a
three-tiered approach to defining procurement.170 Under
Thompson’s approach, managers would be allowed to engage in casual conversation, solicit employment when working in concert with agents, participate in contract negotiations at an agent’s request.171 Thompson contends that his
approach to defining procurement is consistent with the en-

167. Both the courts and the Labor Commissioner have attempted to give
warning to personal managers by giving substance to the term procurement,
however, they have been unable to cultivate a workable criteria for determining
whether an individual has engaged in unlicensed procurement. Furthermore,
the existing judicial and administrative interpretations fail to clarify the concept,
and many individuals still guess at its meaning. Jelin, supra note 10, at 477;
Gilenson, supra note 7, at 510; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 499; Feller, supra note 92,
at 4.
168. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 499; see also Feller, supra note 92, at 4 (stating
that the legislature should remove the ambiguity from the TAA).
169. See discussion supra part I.B.2.a (discussing California’s Entertainment
Commission).
170. Larry Thompson has advocated the following approach to defining
procurement:
[T]he law is supposed to ‘shield’ artists from abuse, not provide a
‘sword’ for voiding contracts. Thus, Mr. Thompson suggests a threetiered approach to the definition of procurement: (1) casual conversation, which a manager should be able to do; (2) solicitation [of] employment, which a manager should be able to do only in conjunction
with an agent; and (3) negotiation of contracts which should be done
only by an agent, unless the agent requests the manager’s participation.
Thompson remarked that under the present law, ‘You could go to a
dinner party, be sitting next to a producer, suggest your client for a role
and that would be procuring.’
Jelin, supra note 10, at 482. Larry Thompson’s views are not indicative of those of
the California Entertainment Commission; rather, they reflect his interest as a
personal manager. Id. Richard Rosenberg, talent agent and member of the
Commission, feels differently about personal managers procuring employment:
“They are not the victims. They chose to go unregulated . . . [i]f they want to
reap the benefits of unlimited commissions . . . then they should run the risk of
their contracts being invalid if they violate the law.” Id.
171. Id.
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tertainment industry reality that personal managers must
engage in procurement activities.172
2. Guilds and Unions
In addition to state licensing requirements, various entertainment unions regulate173 talent agents.174 To protect their
members from unethical personal representatives,175 unions
limit the types of agreements into which their artistmembers can enter.176 Three of the major talent unions177 are
the American Federation of Musicians (“AFM”),178 the
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists
(“AFTRA”),179 and the Screen Actors Guild (“SAG”).180 Union regulation of personal representatives is more extensive
than California’s statutory regulation.181 The entertainment
guilds and unions monitor the relationship between their
172. Id.
173. Unions regulate talent agents by limiting fees, requiring the use of form
contracts, restricting the term of agreements, and requiring that the agent enter
into a franchise agreement with the union. BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 25;
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, supra note 2,
at 487.
174. See BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 25 (noting that entertainment labor unions regulate agents who deal with their members); Abdo, supra note 35, at 4
(explaining that entertainment unions impose additional restrictions on agents to
protect their members).
175. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487; see also BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 25
(noting that entertainment labor unions regulate agents because of concerns
about the “vulnerability of their members due to high unemployment rates”);
Abdo, supra note 35, at 4 (reporting that unions impose restrictions on personal
representatives to protect their members).
176. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487; see, e.g., BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 25;
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479.
177. The Directors Guild of America and the Writers Guild of America are
also significant entertainment guilds. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487.
178. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487.
179. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487.
180. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487.
181. Union regulation is more detailed and rigorous than state regulation.
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; Cole-Wallen, supra
note 47, at 512.
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artist-members and the personal representatives who procure employment for them.182 Unions place many regulations on their members, such as limiting the percentage that
agents may charge, requiring the use of form contracts, and
directing agents to obtain franchise licenses.183
The entertainment guilds and unions also impose restrictive conditions on a personal representative’s compensation.184 AFTRA and SAG prohibit talent agents from receiving commissions that exceed ten percent of the artist’s gross
earnings.185 Nonetheless, AFTRA and SAG do not authorize
their members to pay commissions for the services of a personal manager.186 In addition, they prohibit the payment of
commissions over ten percent to any franchisee.187 The AFM
allows agents to receive commissions of twenty percent for
booking one-night engagements and fifteen percent for

182. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487; Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 519; Abdo, supra note 35, at 4.
183. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 485; BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 25; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492-95. Franchise agreements limit commissions, the duration of agency-agreements, and prohibit certain types of business activities that
talent agents may concurrently engage in. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; see also
Soocher, supra note 42, at 5 (stating that the franchise agreement between the talent agent and the American Federation of Musicians determines the terms of any
agreement between the agent and an artist who is a member of the federation).
184. STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 1; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492;
Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 520-21 (explaining that there is no California law
limiting talent-agency fees, but that the various entertainment unions impose fee
limits on talent agents).
185. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492 (citing American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Regulations Governing Agents, Rule 12-B, § XX, at 21-22
(1971) [hereinafter AFTRA Rule 12-B]; Screen Actors Guild Agency Regulations,
Amended Rule 16(g), § XI, at 18-23 (1968) [hereinafter Rule 16(g)]); see also Jelin,
supra note 10, at 479 (stating that both AFTRA and SAG limit an agent’s commission to 10% of the artist’s gross compensation).
186. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492 (citing AFTRA Rule 12-B, supra note 184,
§ XX, at 21-22; Rule 16(g), supra note 184, at § XI, at 18-23); see also Jelin, supra
note 10, at 479-80 (stating that both AFTRA and SAG prohibit “double compensation,” meaning that when a talent agent and a personal manager represent the
same artist, they have to split the ten percent fee).
187. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492 (citing AFTRA Rule 12-B, supra note 184,
§ XX, at 21-22; Rule 16(g), supra note 184, at § XI, at 18-23).
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longer engagements.188 Moreover, the AFM permits franchised talent agents to sign a personal management agreement that allows agents to act both as personal managers
and booking agents, and entitles them to receive an additional five percent commission.189 Because personal managers usually receive fees in excess of those authorized by the
unions, union regulation prevents personal managers from
receiving their customary fees.190
The unions also regulate the duration of the artistrepresentative relationship.191 SAG and AFTRA impose
term limits of three years in most circumstances.192 In other
circumstances, SAG by-laws limit the agreement to an initial
one-year term.193 The AFM allows five-year terms in some
instances, and up to seven-year terms in others.194 In contrast, the TAA does not limit the duration of the relation-

188. Id. (citing Constitution By-Laws and Policy of the American Federation
of Musicians of the U.S. and Canada, art. XXIII, § 8, at 130 (rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter AFM By-Laws]). The AFM has a more liberal rule because the union recognizes that personal managers provide important services to their members. Jelin,
supra note 10, at 480.
189. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492-93 (citing AFM By-Laws, supra note 188,
art. XXIII, § 8, at 130). The AFM recognizes the purpose served by personal
managers in the music industry by authorizing an additional five percent commission for talent agents providing personal manager services. Jelin, supra note
10, at 480. Aside from this AFM provision, no guild or union recognizes personal managers. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494.
190. See discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing the fees that personal managers usually receive).
191. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 493; see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 479 (noting that unions limit the duration of representative’s contracts).
192. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494 (citing AFTRA Rule 12-B, supra note 184,
§ XIII-B(1), at 15; Rule 16(g), supra note 184, § XI-K(2), at 22); Jelin, supra note 10,
at 480. SAG and AFTRA also provide that artists may terminate their agreements with representatives if the representative does not obtain work for the client within a specified period of time. Id. Subjecting personal managers to this
provision would encourage them to procure employment. Id.
193. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494 (citing Rule 16(g), supra note 184, § XIK(1), at 22); see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 480 (stating that in some instances,
SAG only allows a one-year agreement).
194. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494 (citing AFM By-Laws, supra note 188,
art. XXIII, § 9, at 131-33).
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ship.195 However, California Labor Code section 2855 limits
the term of contracts for personal services to seven years.196
Personal managers prefer longer terms, so as to maximize
the potential return on investment.197
Additionally, the unions do not allow talent agents to
procure employment for any union member without a franchise license from that union.198 Franchise agreements limit
the commissions that talent agents can charge,199 restrict the
length of exclusive representation agreements,200 and prohibit agents from engaging in certain activities.201 The entertainment unions prohibit franchised representatives from
obtaining equity interests in an artist’s total earnings or
products.202 This restriction prevents representatives from
contracting for an equity interest in any artist who is a member of a union.203
The entertainment guilds and unions also prohibit fran195. Id. at 493.
196. Under section 2855 of the California Labor Code, contracts to render
personal services are not enforceable beyond seven years. CAL. LAB. CODE §
2855.
197. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494; see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 480 (stating that personal managers prefer agreements that last for five years, because of
the time necessary to recoup their investment).
198. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 481 (citing Cole-Wallen, supra note 47, at 519);
see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492 (noting that agents representing union artists must be “franchised”).
199. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487 (noting that unions regulate talent agents by limiting fees).
200. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487.
201. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; Jelin, supra note 10, at 479; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487.
202. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 493 (citing AFM By-Laws, supra note 188,
art. XXIII, § 11, at 133; Rule 16(g), supra note 184, § XVI-B, at 28); see also Jelin, supra note 10, at 480 (stating that unions prohibit agents from obtaining equity interests in their clients).
203. According to one commentator, “[a] logical alternative for the manager” who endures great risk is to “contract for an equity interest in the total
earnings of the artist in addition to the commission [the manager] is paid for his
services.” Greenberg, supra note 2, at 493. This type of agreement embodies the
business principle that the rate of return on an investment should reflect the level
of risk. Id.
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chised talent agents from engaging in certain activities,204
particularly from conducting specified forms of business.205
For example, guilds and unions do not allow franchised talent agents to create their own productions.206 Despite this
prohibition, talent agents are free to “package”207 unionmembers into projects.208
Moreover, any union member who engages the services
of a talent agent without a franchise license will be subject to
union discipline.209 Consequently, the union may seek to
impose sanctions on both the artist and the artist’s representative for violating union rules.210 However, the guilds and
unions lack absolute control over the industry, and therefore
cannot always enforce their by-laws and regulations against
all individuals.211
3. California Case Law Interpreting the TAA
For many years, personal managers who performed traditional managerial functions, such as advising, counseling,
directing, and developing an artist’s career, were not within
the scope of the TAA.212 As a result, personal managers who
only incidentally procured employment for artists did not
204. Jelin, supra note 10, at 480; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 487.
205. Jelin, supra note 10, at 480; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 492.
206. Jelin, supra note 10, at 480.
207. “Packaging” occurs when a talent agent groups together all of the artists for a particular project. Id. The talent agent will chose the screenwriter, the
director, the actors, and the musicians; and will bring the completed “package”
to a production company. Id.
208. Id.
209. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494. Union discipline can include a fine,
suspension, or expulsion from the union. Id. Suspension or expulsion can be an
exceptionally harsh punishment to an artist who depends on receiving union
work. Id.
210. Id. The union can proceed against a personal manager who is not licensed as a talent agent. Id. Despite the ability to proceed against personal
managers, unions rarely enforce their regulations against personal managers.
Greenberg, supra note 2, at 494.
211. Id. at 495.
212. Steinberg & Hazzard, supra note 7, at B7.
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think that they were required to obtain a license from the
Labor Commissioner.213 The following cases have established the foundation for subsequent conflicting interpretations of the TAA.214
In Raden v. Laurie,215 Ted Raden, a personal manager,
sued artist Piper Laurie for commissions due under a written
contract.216 The contract stated that the manager was not authorized to procure employment for the artist.217 Laurie
sought to void the contract on the ground that, in disregard
of the contract, Raden had agreed to procure employment.218
Despite Raden’s denial of having ever agreeing to seek engagements for the artist,219 the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the artist.220 On appeal, Raden argued
that summary judgment should not have been granted.221
The Labor Commissioner filed an amicus brief contending
that the contract was a subterfuge designed to conceal
Raden’s procurement function.222 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment
because there was conflicting evidence concerning the terms
of the parties’ agreement.223

213. Id.
214. See discussion infra part II.A (discussing two conflicting interpretations
of the TAA).
215. 262 P.2d 61 (1953).
216. Id. at 63.
217. Id. The contract included the following clause: “nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require [the manager] or authorize [the manager] to
seek or obtain employment for the [artist].” Id.
218. Id. at 63-64. The artist alleged that the unlicensed personal manager
had agreed to attempt to procure employment, and had unsuccessfully tried to
do so on several occasions. Raden, 262 P.2d at 63-64.
219. Id. at 64 (“It was denied in the affidavit that [the manager] stated to [the
artist] that he could or would obtain employment.”).
220. Id. at 63. According to the artist, the trial court granted summary
judgment in her favor on the grounds that the manager was not licensed. Id. at
64.
221. Raden, 262 P.2d at 65.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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In Buchwald v. Superior Court,224 the Court of Appeals presided over a dispute between the musical group Jefferson
Airplane and personal manager Matthew Katz.225 The written agreement between the parties stated that the manager
had agreed not to obtain employment for the group, and that
he was not authorized to do so.226 Nevertheless, the group
alleged that Katz had procured engagements for them.227 In
an attempt to avoid the licensing requirement, Katz argued
that the written agreement established that he was not subject to statutory regulation.228 The court rejected Katz’s contention and declared that Katz could not use a written contract to circumvent the TAA.229 Thus, Buchwald has been
interpreted as standing for the proposition that the substance of an agreement is controlling.230
In Barr v. Rothberg,231 the Labor Commissioner heard a
dispute between actress Roseanne Barr and her personal
manager Arlyne Rothberg.232 Barr argued that Rothberg had
224. 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
225. Id. at 367-68.
226. Id. at 367 (“The contract contained a provision reading: ‘It is clearly
understood that you [Katz] are not an employment agent or theatrical agent, that
you have not offered or attempted or promised to obtain employment or engagements for me, and you are not so obligated, authorized or expected to do
so.’”).
227. Id. at 368.
228. Buchwald, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
229. Id. at 370. The court reasoned that, according to Katz, “[t]he form of the
transaction, rather than its substance would control.” Id. The court stated, “the
Act may not be circumvented by allowing language of the written contract to
control.” Id. Additionally, the court declared: “The court, or as here, the Labor
Commissioner, is free to search out illegality lying behind the form in which a
transaction has been cast for the purpose of concealing such illegality.” Id. (citing
Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons, 308 P.2d 713).
230. Buchwald, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 370; see also Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445
(stating that, “while Buchwald did not address the precise question of whether a
license is necessary for incidental procurement activities, it did hold generally
that procurement efforts require a license and that the substance of the parties’
relationship, not its form, is controlling”); BIEDERMAN, supra note 35, at 12 (asserting that the Buchwald decision demonstrates how the Labor Commission’s jurisdiction is implied from the performance of talent agency services).
231. No. TAC 14-90 (1992).
232. Id.
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acted as an unlicensed agent by participating in the negotiation of her employment agreements.233 The Labor Commissioner found that Rothberg had worked with Barr’s agents
and that Rothberg had limited her input to creative issues.234
The Commission examined the totality of the manager’s activity and adopted a center-of-gravity test.235 Under this test,
a manager may incidentally participate in negotiations conducted by a licensed talent agent if the manager’s primary
concern is the client’s career direction.236 The Labor Commissioner concluded that Rothberg’s role in the negotiations
was directed towards developing Barr’s career, rather than
procuring the employment agreement.237 The Labor Commissioner’s decision allows managers who are concerned
primarily with their artist-client’s career direction to participate in agent-conducted negotiations.238
Thus, after Barr, commentators maintain that the Labor
Commissioner is more tolerant of personal manager involvement in employment negotiations.239 Nevertheless,
personal managers are not permitted to procure employment for artists.
D. Entertainment Industry Regulation in New York
Like California, New York has a significant entertainment industry.240 In order to regulate the industry, New
York has adopted a detailed regulatory scheme.241 This section examines how New York regulates the entertainment
industry and how the New York courts administer this regulatory system.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 488.
Id.
Id. at 488-89.
Id. at 488.
Id. (citing Barr v. Rothberg, No. TAC 14-90 (1992)).
SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 488.
Id.
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 472.
BIEDERMAN, supra note 34, at 4.
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1. Statutory Regulation
Section 172 of New York’s General Business Law242 prohibits the operation of an employment agency without a license;243 unlicensed procurement activities constitute a misdemeanor.244 New York’s employment agency statute245
contains an exception to the licensing requirement for persons engaged in “the business of managing such entertainments . . . [and] artists . . . where such business only incidentally involves the seeking of employment . . . .”246 The
242. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 172 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997).
243. Id.; see also Paul Karl Lukacs, How New York and Tennessee Regulate Talent Agencies, 14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 15, 15 (1996) (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 172
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996)) (stating that “every person who operates an
‘employment agency’ for a fee must be licensed”).
244. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 190; see also Lukacs, supra note 242, at 16 (noting
that violating the licensing requirement is a misdemeanor). In New York, both
the commissioner and artists have the power to initiate criminal proceedings.
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 190, 193 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996). In California,
unlicensed procurement is specifically excluded from the criminal statutes. CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1700.44(b). Nevertheless, the civil penalties in California can be
harsh. See discussion supra part I.C.2.c (discussing penalties imposed for violation of TAA).
245. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171. New York regulates talent agencies as part
of the state’s overall regulation of employment agencies. Lukacs, supra note 242,
at 15 (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 170-194 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996)). An
“employment agency” includes a “theatrical employment agency,” defined as a
person who “procures or attempts to procure” engagements for “circus, vaudeville, the variety field, the legitimate theater, motion pictures, radio, television,
phonograph recordings, transcriptions, opera, concert, ballet, modeling or other
entertainments or exhibitions or performances . . . .” N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§
171(2)(d), 171(8) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996)).
246. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8); see, e.g., Lukacs, supra note 242, at 15 (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8)); Soocher, supra note 42, at 5. New York’s case
law does not really flesh out the meaning of the exception. Lukacs, supra note
242, at 15. Typically, the court will state that the relationship does or does not
satisfy the requirements of the exception. Id. (citing Angileri v. Vivanco, 137
N.Y.S.2d 662, 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (“It is hard to believe that the claim [of exemption] is serious”); Nazarro v. Washington, 81 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1948) (“Clearly, the terms of this contract bring it within the exception . . . .”);
Gervis v. Knapp, 182 Misc. 311, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943) (“The contract establishes that plaintiff was primarily a manager . . . .”)). Whether the incidental
booking exception applies to an individual is a question of fact to be decided
“[u]pon proof of all the facts and circumstances, including the conduct of the
parties . . . .” Hyde v. Vinolas, 254 N.Y.S. 687, 689 (App. Div. 1932); see also
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incidental booking exception applies only to representatives
who function primarily as personal managers for their artistclients.247
Unlike California law, New York law does not recognize
an exception to the licensing requirement for individuals
who work with licensed theatrical agents.248 Rather, New
York law discourages personal managers from working with
agents,249 by subjecting them to the potential loss of the protection of the incidental booking exception if they perform
their services in concert with talent agents.250
New York’s statutory scheme also lays out the formal
steps necessary to obtain a theatrical employment agency license.251 All licensed agencies must pay a licensing fee to,
and deposit a bond with, either the state or city commis-

Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 680, 682 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) (stating
that determining whether the exception applies is a question of fact); Lukacs, supra note 242, at 15 (noting that whether a contract is incidentally one for agency
services is a question of fact). For an example of a case in which disputed actions
were held to fall within the exception, see Heyman v. Howell, 133 N.Y.S.2d 19
(Spec. Sess. 1954).
247. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8); Jelin, supra note 10, at 478; Soocher, supra
note 42, at 5; Lukacs, supra note 242, at 15 (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8)).
The exception is not available to all individuals who engage in incidental procurement. Jelin, supra note 10, at 478. For New York cases that have upheld the
exception in favor of personal managers, see Pine v. Laine, 36 A.D.2d 924 (N.Y.
App. Term 1971), aff’d, 321 N.Y.2d 988 (1973); Nazarro v. Washington, 81 N.Y.S.2d
769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948) (finding that the terms of the contract brought it within
the incidental booking exception); Gervis v. Knapp, 182 Misc. 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1948); Pawlowski v. Woodruff, 122 Misc. 695 (N.Y. App. Term 1924), aff’d, 212 A.D.
891 (N.Y. 1925). For New York cases that have found that the procurement activity brought the relationship outside of the exception because it was more than
“incidental,” see Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 680 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1977); Russell-Stewart, Inc. v. Birkett, 24 Misc. 2d 528 (N.Y. 1960); Angileri v.
Vivanco, 137 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
248. See discussion supra part I.C.2.b (describing TAA exemption for working in concert with licensed talent agents).
249. Jelin, supra note 10, at 478.
250. In New York, working in concert with an agent has been used to prove
that the personal manager was engaged in too much procurement of employment. Id.
251. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 172-176.
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sioner.252 Claims and suits brought against a licensed
agency are often satisfied with payment from the agency’s
bond deposit.253
In the interest of protecting individuals seeking employment, New York places additional prohibitions on the conduct of employment agencies.254 New York law limits the
fees that may be charged by a licensed agency.255 The statute
also includes sections on provision enforcement,256 and penalties for violations.257
2. New York Case Law
As discussed above, New York’s statutory regulation of
talent agents includes an incidental booking exception for
personal managers.258 The New York courts have had little
difficulty administering the exception.259
In Mandel v. Liebman,260 New York’s Court of Appeals
faced a dispute between personal manager Louis Mandel
and artist Max Liebman.261 Mandel brought the action
against Liebman to collect commissions allegedly due under

252. Id. § 177. The agency will pay either the industrial commissioner of the
State of New York, or the commissioner of licenses of the City of New York. Id. §
171.1.
253. Id. § 178.
254. Id. § 187. For example, employment agencies are prohibited from sending clients to any place “maintained for immoral or illicit purposes.” N.Y. GEN.
BUS. LAW § 187.6.
255. Id. § 185. Theatrical engagements are classified as Class C. Id. § 185.4.
As such, the maximum fee allowed is 10% of the artist’s gross compensation for
a single engagement or 20% for engagements in the opera and concert fields. Id.
§ 185.8.
256. Id. § 189.
257. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 190. Criminal proceedings are authorized for violations of the statute. Id.
258. See discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing incidental booking exception).
259. See O’Brien, supra note 2, at 509 (noting that only a few New York cases
have involved disputes over the incidental booking exception).
260. 100 N.E.2d 149 (N.Y. 1951).
261. Id. at 150.
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a management contract.262 The Supreme Court interpreted
the contract as one that is terminable at will, and dismissed
the complaint.263 The Appellate Division affirmed the trial
court’s decision on the grounds that the contract was void
and against public policy because Mandel was not required
to perform any services for Liebman.264 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals declared that New York’s incidental booking exception prevented courts from finding a contract illegal solely on the grounds that an unlicensed personal manager procured employment for an artist.265 Furthermore, the
court stated that the issue of whether an unlicensed personal
manager violated New York’s licensing requirements was a
question of fact for the jury.266 Thus, Mandel demonstrates
how New York’s incidental booking exception was designed
to work.
In Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc.,267 the Civil Court of the
City of New York addressed the following issue: whether
the licensing requirements applied to a booking agent who
secured lectures and engagements for a motion picture and
theatrical personality.268 William Friedkin brought suit to
recover commissions paid to Harry Walker, the booking
262. Id. at 151.
263. Id.
264. 101 N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Term 1950). Subsequently, the Appellate Division denied reargument and granted a change in opinion. 102 N.Y.S.2d 563
(App. Term 1951).
265. 100 N.E.2d at 155. The court stated that:
[I]t cannot be said as matter of law that the contract was illegal and void
for the reason that plaintiff, in violation of section 172 . . . was conducting a theatrical employment agency without a license therefor. By express exemption in subdivision 4 of section 171 . . . a person engaged in
the business of managing ‘entertainments, exhibitions or performances,
or the artists or attractions constituting the same, where such business
only incidentally involves the seeking of employment therefor’ is not
required to be licensed.
Id.; see discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing incidental booking exception).
266. 100 N.E.2d at 155. The court reversed the judgment and granted a new
trial. Id.
267. 395 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
268. 395 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
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agent who secured engagements for him.269 The court held
that agents must be licensed if they do not satisfy the requirements of the incidental booking exception.270 The court
declared that the incidental booking exception did not apply
to Walker because he did not serve as Friedkin’s personal
manager.271 Furthermore, the court ordered Walker to return his commissions to Friedkin.272 Thus, Friedkin demonstrates the criteria that must be satisfied in order for the incidental booking exception to apply to an individual.273
II. THE CALIFORNIA TALENT AGENCIES ACT: JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Part II presents the legal conflict in the California Court
of Appeals over whether unlicensed personal managers are
permitted to procure employment. First, this part examines
the interpretation of the TAA in Wachs v. Curry,274 a decision
that allows personal managers to procure employment for
artists if procurement is not a significant part of the manager’s business.275 Second, this part discusses Waisbren v.
269. Id. at 612.
270. Id. at 611. The court stated: agents must be licensed “ . . . unless the
agent is in the business of managing such a clientele and the seeking of employment is only incidentally involved.” Id. There are two requirements to satisfy
the incidental booking exception: (1) the representative must serve as personal
manager to the client, and (2) the seeking of employment must be incidental to
the managerial role. See discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing incidental booking exception).
271. Friedkin, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 613. The court stated: “[t]he instant contract
cannot be characterized as one of management: it is abundantly clear upon a
reading that [Friedkin’s] obligation is to solicit lecturing engagements for
[Walker] . . . [Friedkin] is clearly an unlicensed employment agency within N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW 171(2)(a) and the exclusionary provision of N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW
171(8) is clearly inapplicable.” Id. at 613-14 (citing Pine v. Laine, 36 A.D.2d 924
(N.Y. App. Term 1971), aff’d, 293 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y. 1973); Allen v. Brice, 165 Misc.
181 (N.Y. 1937); Farnum v. O’Neill, 141 Misc. 555 (N.Y. 1931); Meyers v. Walton,
76 Misc. 510 (N.Y. 1912).
272. Friedkin, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
273. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (describing when incidental
booking exception applies).
274. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (Ct. App. 1993).
275. Id. at 503.
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Peppercorn Productions, Inc.,276 a Court of Appeals decision
that conflicts with Wachs, by prohibiting personal managers
from procuring employment without obtaining a talent
agent’s license.277 Finally, this part reviews possible solutions to the dilemma created by these two conflicting decisions.
A. Recent California Decisions
Recently, two courts have reached opposing conclusions
in interpreting the TAA.278 In Wachs, the Court of Appeals
held that unlicensed personal managers can procure employment on an incidental basis.279 However, in Waisbren,
the Court of Appeals held that only licensed talent agents
may engage in procurement activities.280
1. Wachs v. Curry
In Wachs v. Curry, the California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, elaborated on the center-of-gravity
test enunciated in Barr.281 The Wachs court held that unlicensed personal managers may procure employment for
their clients if such activities do not constitute a “significant
part” of the manager’s business.282 Wachs involved a dispute
based on a written contract between the entertainer Arsenio
Hall, and Wachs and X Management, Inc. for personal management services.283 Hall filed a petition with the Labor
276. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1995).
277. Id. at 441.
278. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 490.
279. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503.
280. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.
281. See discussion supra part I.C.3 (describing the center-of-gravity test that
was adopted by the court in Barr).
282. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. The Wachs court held that personal
managers who incidentally procure employment for their clients are not subject
to the TAA. Id.; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7.
283. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498. Plaintiffs contracted for 15% of Hall’s
earnings from his entertainment industry activities. Id. The contract established
that: “You [Hall] have not retained our personal management firm under this
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Commissioner when Wachs allegedly acted as an unlicensed
talent agent by procuring and attempting to procure employment for the entertainer.284 Hall requested that the Labor Commissioner order Wachs to return all monies received from either Hall or Hall’s employers in connection
with Hall’s entertainment industry activities.285 Wachs filed
an answer to Hall’s petition denying the allegations.286
Before the Labor Commissioner could resolve the controversy, Wachs and X Management sued the Labor Commissioner in California state court,287 alleging that the TAA’s licensing provisions were unconstitutional.288 Wachs argued
that the TAA was unconstitutional because no rational basis
existed for exempting the procurement of recording contracts from the licensing requirement.289 Furthermore,
Wachs contended that the language of the TAA was unconstitutionally vague.290 Wachs sought a judgment declaring
the TAA unconstitutional, thereby enjoining the Labor
Commissioner from enforcing the licensing requirement.291
The trial court, however, granted the state’s motion for
summary judgment and held that the licensing provisions
were constitutional.292
On appeal, the Court of Appeals faced two issues: (1)
whether a rational basis existed for exempting procurement
agreement as an employment agent or a talent agent. This firm has not offered
or attempted or promised to obtain employment or engagement for you and this
firm is not obligated, authorized or expected to do so.” Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498.
287. Id. (“While Hall’s petition was pending before the labor commissioner,”
Wachs and X Management initiated action against the Labor Commissioner “and
other state officials charged with enforcing the Act.”).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498. Wachs alleged that “it cannot be determined from the language of the Act which activities require licensing as a talent
agent.” Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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of recording contracts from the licensing requirements of the
TAA,293 and (2) whether the licensing provisions were unconstitutionally vague.294 In deciding the first issue, the
court applied the conventional “rational relationship” test,
which requires a rational relationship between the statute’s
purpose and the means by which it is accomplished.295 The
court noted that the California legislature had created the
California Entertainment Commission to study the TAA,296
and that the Entertainment Commission recommended that
the legislature exempt the procurement of recording contracts from the licensing requirements of the TAA.297 The
court accepted the Commission’s recommendation as constituting a rational basis for the provision.298 Additionally, the
court observed that, even within the same business, statutes
may classify individuals differently when such persons perform different work.299 The court concluded that a rational
basis existed for exempting procurement of record contracts
from the licensing requirements.300
Second, the Wachs court addressed whether the licensing
requirements of the TAA are void for vagueness.301 Wachs
293. Id. at 501-02.
294. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502-04.
295. Id. at 501 (citing D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal.3d 1,
17 (1974)).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 502. The court noted that the California Entertainment Commission recommended the exemption because recording contracts and other personal-services contracts differ fundamentally. Id.; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7
(citing Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 625-26). Additionally, the court acknowledged
the personal manager’s role in securing recording contracts for artists. Steinberg,
supra note 7, at B7 (citing Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 625-26).
298. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502. The court stated that the “report from
the Legislature’s own commission of experts provide[d] a sufficiently rational
basis for the exemption from the licensing requirement.” Id.
299. Id. The court noted that “[n]umerous decisions” support classifying
differently “persons in the same general type of business . . . where their methods of operation are not identical.” Id. (citing Marsh & McLennan of Cal., Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. App. 3d 108, 121 (1976)).
300. Id. at 501.
301. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502-04.
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contended that the term “occupation of procuring [employment],” found in section 1700.4(a) of the TAA, did not sufficiently define what type of conduct required a license.302
The court noted that the issue raised due process concerns.303
The court applied the Hall v. Bureau of Employment Agencies304 test to determine whether the statute satisfied due
process.305 This test inquires whether words used in a statute can be made “reasonably certain” by referring to “definable sources.”306 The court reasoned that an individual
could determine with “reasonable certainty”307 what types of
conduct required a license by examining the dictionary definitions of “occupation” and “procurement,”308 and the legislative purpose and history of the TAA.309 Consequently, the
302. Id. at 502.
303. Id.
304. 64 Cal. App. 3d 482 (1976).
305. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502 (citing Hall, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 494). The
court stated that:
[I]f the words used may be made reasonably certain by reference to the
common law, to the legislative history of the statute involved, or to the
purpose of that statute, the legislation will be sustained. . . . Reasonable
certainty is all that is required. A statute will not be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given its
language.
Id. (citing Hall, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 494).
306. See supra note 305 (discussing the Hall test).
307. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502.
308. The court defined “occupation” as “the principal business of one’s life:
a craft, trade, profession or other means of earning a living.” Id. (citing
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1560 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter
WEBSTER’S]). The court stated that the term “procure” meant “to get possession
of: obtain, acquire, to cause to happen or be done: bring about.” Id. at 503 (citing WEBSTER’S, supra, at 1809).
309. The court compared the activities regulated by the Artists’ Managers
Act of 1943 and the TAA. Id. The court stated that:
Comparison of the activities regulated in the two acts shows a marked
change of emphasis from the counseling function to the employment
procurement function. Under the Artists’ Managers Act the focus was
on persons who engaged in ‘the occupation of advising, counseling or
directing artists’ in the ‘development or advancement’ of their careers
and who engaged in procuring employment ‘only in connection with
and as a part of’ their duties as advisor and counselor. Under the Act,
the focus is on persons engaged ‘in the occupation of procur-
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court concluded that the statute satisfied due process concerns.310
Third, the court examined the TAA’s legislative history
under the Hall test and found that its purpose was the protection of artists.311 Toward this end, the court applied the
Barr test to the personal manager’s overall business to determine whether an agency license was required.312 The Barr
test determines if an individual is subject to the TAA’s licensing requirements by examining the totality of the manager’s activities for the client at issue.313 In contrast, the
Wachs test examines the totality of the manager’s activities
for all clients.314 The Wachs test asks if the procurement activities are a “significant portion” or an “incidental part” of
an individual’s business.315 Under this test, individuals being . . . employment or engagements for an artist. . . .’ These persons
‘may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of their
professional careers.’
Id. at 503.
310. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 502; see discussion supra part I.C.3 (discussing Barr test).
313. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503.
314. Id. The court stated that:
We conclude from the Act’s obvious purpose to protect artists seeking
employment and from its legislative history, the ‘occupation’ of procuring employment was intended to be determined according to a standard that measures the significance of the agent’s employment function
compared to the agent’s counseling function taken as a whole. If the
agent’s employment function constitutes a significant portion of the
agent’s business as a whole then he or she is subject to the licensing requirement of the Act, even if, with respect to a particular client, procurement of employment was only an incidental part of the agent’s
overall duties. On the other hand, if counseling and directing the clients’ careers constitutes the significant part of the agent’s business then
he or she is not subject to the licensing requirements of the Act, even if
with respect to a particular client, counseling and directing the client’s
career was only an incidental part of the agent’s overall duties. What
constitutes a ‘significant part’ of the agent’s business is an element of
degree we need not decide in this case.
Id.
315. Id. The California Labor Commissioner was the defendant in the Wachs
case, and “according to oral statements later made by the Labor Commissioner’s
lawyer, it was the Commissioner’s lawyer himself who had made the ‘significant
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come subject to the licensing provisions when their procurement function extends beyond an incidental part of their
business.316 Thus, the court concluded that the licensing requirements of the TAA were not void due to vagueness,317
and affirmed the trial court’s decision.318
After Wachs, the Labor Commissioner employed the
“significant part” test when determining whether the TAA
had been violated.319
2. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc.
In Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc.,320 the California Court of Appeals rejected the “significant part” test
adopted in Wachs in favor of a rule that requires personal
managers who incidentally procure employment for artists
to obtain talent agency licenses. From 1982 through 1988,
Brad Waisbren served as the personal manager for Peppercorn Productions, Inc., a corporation that specializes in designing puppets for use in the entertainment industry.321 In
1990, Waisbren sued Peppercorn for commissions allegedly
due under an oral management agreement.322 Waisbren
admitted to having only occasionally engaged in unlicensed
procurement activities for Peppercorn.323 Consequently, the
Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Peppart’ argument to the appellate court.” Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7.
316. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503.
317. Id. at 502.
318. Id. at 504.
319. See, e.g., Church v. Brown, No. TAC 52-92 (1994); see also Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7.
320. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 437 (Ct. App. 1995); Stan Soocher, Incidental Determination, 10 ENT. L. & FINANCE 8 (1996).
321. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439; Soocher, supra note 320, at 8; Pantoga,
supra note 50, at 327; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7.
322. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7; Pantoga,
supra note 50, at 327; Soocher, supra note 320, at 8.
323. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439 n.3; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7; Pantoga, supra note 50, at 327. On some occasions, Waisbren procured employment
on behalf of Peppercorn, “but his efforts in that regard were incidental to his
other responsibilities.” Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439.
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percorn.324 The court found that the management contract
was void because Waisbren had engaged in talent agency
services by procuring employment for Peppercorn without
having obtained a talent agency license.325
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal held that an
individual must be licensed under the TAA even if the individual occasionally procures employment for artists.326 In
reaching its decision, the court examined: (1) the plain
meaning of the TAA;327 (2) the remedial purpose of the
TAA;328 (3) the Labor Commissioner’s interpretation of the
TAA;329 (4) recent legislative action;330 (5) the TAA’s limited
exception for unlicensed persons;331 and (6) prior judicial
construction of the TAA.332
First, the Waisbren court analyzed the TAA’s plain meaning to determine whether it applied to managers who only
incidentally procure employment for artists.333 The court rejected Waisbren’s argument that he was not required to obtain a license because his principal responsibilities did not
involve procuring employment for Peppercorn.334 The court
stated that Waisbren’s narrow definition335 unfairly limited

324. Id.
325. Id.; Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7; Pantoga, supra note 50, at 327; Soocher, supra note 320, at 8.
326. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441. The court had to “decide whether a
person needs to be licensed under the Act if he occasionally procures employment for an artist” and “conclude[d] that a license is required.” Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 441-42.
329. Id. at 442.
330. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442-45.
331. Id. at 445.
332. Id. at 445-46.
333. Id. at 441.
334. Id. The court disagreed with Waisbren’s contention that “because ‘occupation’ is defined as ‘the principal business of one’s life,’” a license is only
necessary when “a person’s principal responsibilities involve procuring employment for an artist.” Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.
335. See supra note 334 (describing the narrow definition of “occupation”
that Brad Waisbren supported).
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the term “occupation.”336 The court further reasoned that a
person can engage in an “occupation” even if he does not
spend most of his time in that business.337 The court concluded that a person can be engaged in an “occupation” that
is not his principal line of work.338
Second, the Waisbren court reasoned that all persons who
procure employment for artists must be licensed because of
the purpose behind the TAA.339 The court declared that the
TAA served a remedial purpose,340 and that the Wachs test
defeated this purpose because it was “unworkable.”341 Furthermore, the court reasoned that limiting an unlicensed
manager to engaging in only incidental procurement activities would not help the artist who falls “victim to a violation
of the [TAA].”342 Therefore, the court concluded that both
the “occasional” talent agent and the full-time agent are sub336. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441. The court observed that the narrow
definition “ignores the possibility that a person can have more than one job.” Id.
337. Id. The court stated that “‘occupation’ is synonymous with ‘employment,’ which includes ‘temporary or occasional work or service for pay.” Id. (citing WEBSTER’S, supra note 306, at 743); see also Pantoga, supra note 50, at 328 (noting that individuals can engage in part-time occupations, and can have
occupations that are not their sole line of work); Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7.
338. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441. Additionally, the court reasoned that
“the Act is entirely consistent with the concept of dual occupations—for example, being a personal manager and a talent agent.” Id. The court declared that
their “interpretation of the statutory language d[id] not render the term ‘occupation’ mere surplusage.” Id. at 441 n.6. The court proposed that the legislature
included the term “occupation” because they “intended to cover those who are
compensated for their procurement efforts.” Id.
339. Id. at 441-42. The legislature enacted the TAA to protect artists. See
discussion supra part I.C.1.a (explaining legislative intent of the TAA).
340. Waisbren, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441. The court noted that “[t]he Act is a
remedial statute.” Id. (citing Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 367
(Ct. App. 1967)). The TAA was enacted for the benefit of artists seeking employment. Id. (citing Buchwald, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 367).
341. Id. at 442. The court stated that “[t]he statutory goal of protecting artists would be defeated if the Act applied only” when a personal manager significantly engages in procurement of “employment for artists.” Id.; see also Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7 (stating that the Waisbren court noted that the significant
part test was unworkable and would undermine the remedial purpose of the
TAA).
342. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442.
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ject to the TAA’s regulations.343
Third, the Waisbren court examined the Labor Commissioner’s interpretation of the TAA.344 The court noted that
the Labor Commissioner had authority to enforce the
TAA.345 The court stated that the Labor Commissioner had
interpreted the TAA as requiring all individuals who procure employment for artists to obtain licenses.346 The court
observed that an enforcing agency’s interpretation of a statute is entitled to great consideration.347 Furthermore, the
court noted that courts should defer to an enforcing agency’s
reasonable interpretation of a statute.348 Finally, the court
concluded that the Labor Commissioner’s interpretation of
343. Id. The court “refuse[d] to believe that the Legislature intended to exempt a personal manager from the Act—thereby allowing violations to go unremedied—unless his procurement efforts cross some nebulous threshold from
‘incidental’ to ‘principal.’” Id. The court expanded on its argument, stating:
Perhaps a personal manager’s procurement activities should no longer
be considered ‘incidental’ when they exceed 10 percent of his total
business. Or perhaps the line should be drawn at 25 or 50 percent. We
simply cannot make this determination because the Act provides no rational basis for doing so. Moreover, even if we could somehow justify
using a particular figure, it would be virtually impossible to determine
accurately whether a personal manager had exceeded it.
Id. at 442 n.10.
344. Id. at 442.
345. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a)).
346. Id. The Labor Commissioner “has long taken the position that a license
is required for incidental procurement activities.” Id.; see also Steinberg, supra
note 7, at B7. But see Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7 (noting that the
“significant part” test was urged on the courts by the Labor Commissioner, and
that the test has been used by the Labor Commissioner ever since). In Derek v.
Callan, No. TAC 18-80 (Jan. 14, 1982, Lab. Comr.), a personal manager argued
that the TAA allowed incidental procurement of employment. Id. at 6. The Labor Commissioner responded, “[t]hat is like saying you can sell one house without a real estate license or one bottle of liquor without an offsale license.” Id.;
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442.
347. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. The court stated that “[t]he construction of a statute by an agency charged with its administration is entitled to great
weight.” Id. (citing Henning v. Industrial Welfare Com., 46 Cal.3d 1262, 1269
(1988)).
348. Id. “If the administrative agency’s construction is reasonable,” the
Waisbren court declared that other courts “should defer to it.” Id. (citing Henning,
46 Cal.3d at 1269).
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the TAA—that a license is required to engage in any procurement activities on behalf of an artist—was reasonable,
and thus, upheld it.349
Fourth, the Waisbren court considered the California legislature’s position as requiring a license for the incidental
procurement of employment.350 Additionally, the court analyzed the California Entertainment Commission’s report regarding the TAA.351 The court observed that the Commission had determined that a license was necessary to perform
any procurement activity.352 Furthermore, the court noted
that the California Legislature had adopted all of the Commission’s recommendations.353 Consequently, the court
concluded that the legislature had approved the Commission’s view that only licensed talent agents can procure employment for artists.354
Fifth, the Waisbren court declared that the TAA’s limited
exception to the licensing requirement—namely, working in
concert with a licensed talent agent355—required all indi349. Id. Because the court found “the Labor Commissioner’s interpretation
of the Act” to be reasonable, the court “agree[d] with his analysis of the licensing
requirement.” Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442.
350. Id. The court declared that “the Legislature has adopted the view that a
license is required for incidental procurement activities.” Id.
351. Id. at 443; see discussion supra part I.C.2.a (describing California’s Entertainment Commission’s report).
352. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443 (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 98, at 6). The Report’s first issue was: “Under what conditions or circumstances, if any, should personal managers or anyone other than a
licensed talent agent be allowed to procure employment for an artist without being licensed as a talent agent?” Id. (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 98, at 6). The Report indicated that “[n]o person, including personal
managers, should be allowed to procure employment for an artist in any manner
without being licensed as a talent agent.” Id. (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 98, at 1).
353. Id. at 444.
354. Id. (citing ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 11).
The court observed that “[t]his legislative approval extends to the Commission’s
finding that the Act imposes a total prohibition on the procurement efforts of
unlicensed persons.” Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444-45 (citing ENTERTAINMENT
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 11).
355. Pursuant to section 1700.44(d), unlicensed representatives may act “in
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viduals who procure employment for artists to obtain
agency licenses.356 Under this exception, a personal manager
who cooperates with a licensed talent agent can seek employment for an artist.357 The court stated that reading the
TAA to allow unlicensed individuals to engage in incidental
procurement activities would render this exception “superfluous.”358 Accordingly, the court concluded that the TAA
does not allow for unlicensed procurement by managers because it contains the exception regarding managers’ working
with licensed agents.359
Finally, the Waisbren court analyzed prior judicial construction of the TAA.360 The Waisbren court noted that, in
Buchwald, the court interpreted the TAA to require a license
for all procurement activities.361 Additionally, the Waisbren
court examined Wachs,362 and acknowledged the Wachs
conjunction with, and at the request of, a licensed talent agency in the negotiation of an employment contract” for an artist. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d); see
discussion supra part I.C.2.b (discussing exception for working in concert with
licensed talent agents).
356. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
357. Id. (citing O’Brien, supra note 2, at 500).
358. Id. The Waisbren court reasoned that “this exception to the licensing
scheme would be unnecessary if incidental or occasional procurement efforts did
not require a license in the first place.” Id.; see also Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7
(stating that the Waisbren court reasoned that the exception for working with licensed agents would be unnecessary if incidental procurement did not require a
license).
359. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
360. Id. at 445-46.
361. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445 (citing 62 Cal. Rptr. at 364); see also discussion supra part I.C.3 (describing the Buchwald decision). Although Buchwald
did not address specifically “whether a license is necessary for incidental procurement activities, it did hold generally that procurement efforts require a license and that the substance of the parties’ relationship, not its form, is controlling.” Id.
362. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445-46; see discussion supra part II.A.1 (discussing the Wachs decision). The Waisbren court noted:
[T]hat Wachs applied an overly narrow concept of “occupation” and did
not consider the remedial purpose of the Act, the decisions of the Labor
Commissioner, or the Legislature’s adoption of the view (as expressed
in the California Entertainment Commission’s Report) that a license is
necessary for incidental procurement activities.
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
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court’s holding that the licensing requirement does not apply unless an individual’s procurement activities constituted
a “significant part” of his business.363 The Waisbren court determined that, because Wachs declined to define “significant
part,”364 the import of its holding was unclear.365 Additionally, the court noted that Wachs addressed a limited issue:
whether the TAA’s use of the term “procure” was unconstitutionally vague.366 The Waisbren court held that the TAA
did not support the Wachs holding, and was therefore
wrongly decided.367 Consequently, the court rejected Waisbren’s argument that the TAA did not require him to have
an agent’s license because his procurement activities were
only occasional.368
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals ruled that the management contract was void due to Waisbren’s unlicensed
procurement efforts.369 To this end, the court affirmed the
trial court’s decision, granting summary judgment in favor
of Peppercorn.370
Although Waisbren is the latest statement of the law, it
does not clarify the confusion in California’s entertainment
363. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446 (citing Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503).
364. Id. (citing Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503).
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. The court stated that:
Given Wachs’ recognition of the limited nature of the issue before it, we
regard as dicta the court’s interpretation of the term “occupation” and
its statement that the Act does not apply unless a person’s procurement
function is significant. Because the Wachs dicta is contrary to the Act’s
language and purpose, we decline to follow it. . . . Thus, we conclude
that the Wachs dicta is incorrect to the extent it indicates that a license is
required only where a person’s procurement efforts are “significant.”
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446; see also Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7 (noting that
the Waisbren court rejected the “significant part” test as incorrect dicta).
368. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445. The court disagreed with Waisbren’s
argument that the Wachs holding compelled “the conclusion that a personal
manager need not be licensed if he procures employment for an artist on an occasional basis.” Id.
369. Id. at 437.
370. Id.
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industry.371 The Waisbren decision directly contradicts the
critical portion of the Wachs holding.372 Commentators contend that more litigation is sure to follow due to these two
conflicting California Court of Appeal decisions.373
B. Possible Solutions
Personal managers perform an essential role in the entertainment industry.374 In their normal course of business,
however, they risk incurring legal sanctions.375 Commentators have suggested ways for the legislature to remove these
risks and thereby encourage individuals to perform personal
management services.376 This section examines two potential solutions for resolving the conflict of whether personal
managers may ever procure employment for clients. The
first proposal suggests that the legislature amend the TAA to
include an incidental booking exception. The second recommendation recommends that the legislature enact a statute which explicitly regulates personal managers.
1. The Incidental Booking Exception
Commentators argue that the California Legislature
should amend the TAA to include an incidental booking exception.377 They contend that this proposal would be beneficial in two respects: (1) it would encourage individuals to
become personal managers, and (2) it would provide benefits to an artist employing the services of a personal man-

371. SIEGEL I, supra note 7, at 490.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 508; see discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing personal manager’s role in the entertainment industry).
375. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 508; see discussion supra part I.C.2.c (discussing legal sanctions that may be imposed on individuals who violate the
TAA).
376. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 508. A solution must encourage persons to
become personal managers and protect their interests. Id.
377. Id. at 509-10; O’Brien, supra note 2, at 508-09.
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ager.378 Drafted carefully, they assert that an incidental
booking exception would be advantageous to both personal
managers and artists.379
Commentators suggest enacting an incidental booking
exception because it acknowledges an entertainment industry reality—that “any personal manager worth his or her
commission”380 procures at least some employment for a client.381 Critics also argue that the exception would remove
some of the risks that personal managers face while conducting their day-to-day services382—namely, that an artist will
attempt to void an otherwise legitimate contract for management services,383 and subject the personal manager to
harsh penalties from the Labor Commissioner for engaging
in any unlicensed procurement activity.384 Accordingly,
many commentators contend that an incidental booking exception would encourage individuals to become personal
managers.
Commentators also assert that artists would benefit from
an incidental booking exception.385 They argue that artists
would receive better representation under the exception,386
because an artist who is unhappy with the engagements
supplied by their licensed talent agent could secure employment elsewhere.387 Consequently, commentators argue
that artists would receive better representation and more
378. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 509-10.
379. Id. at 509-10.
380. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (explaining that personal
managers must procure employment).
381. See supra notes 49-78 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
personal manager in the entertainment industry).
382. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 509-10.
383. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text (explaining that artist
may seek to void management contracts in order to avoid paying for management services).
384. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 509-10; see discussion supra part I.C.2.c (describing penalties that the Labor Commissioner has authority to administer).
385. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 510.
386. Id.
387. Id.
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choice of engagements if the legislature enacted the exception.388
In order to clearly define who can engage in unlicensed
procurement, commentators Johnson and Lang have suggested exempting personal managers who do not regularly
perform procurement activities.389 A second approach is to
exempt personal managers who have made reasonable, but
unsuccessful, attempts at securing a licensed talent agent for
their clients.390
Critics of the incidental booking exception counter that
such a law would be ambiguous because there is no workable test.391 Nonetheless, proponents maintain that New York
has successfully employed its incidental booking exception
in a sensible manner,392 and that the California Legislature
should use New York’s exception as a model for drafting a
similar provision.393 Accordingly, they propose to amend
section 1700.4(a) of the TAA to state the following:
Talent agency means a person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or
attempting to procure employment or engagements for an
artist or artists, except (1) that the activities of procuring, offering, or promising to procure recording contracts for an
artist or artists shall not of itself subject a person or corporation to regulation and licensing under this chapter; and (2)
that a person or corporation shall not be subject to regulation and
licensing under this chapter (a) when the person or corporation is
acting as personal manager for an artist or artists, and (b) the person’s or corporation’s services only incidentally involves procur388. Id.
389. Id. The New York courts have employed this method in administering
their incidental booking exception. See, e.g., Friedkin v. Harry Walker Inc., 90
Misc. 2d 680 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977).
390. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 510.
391. Id. (citing Hearings, supra note 83, at 49-50 (statement of Harry Sloan,
National Executive Secretary to the Screen Actors Guild)).
392. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 509.
393. Id.

1997]

THE PERSONAL MANAGERS ACT

985

ing, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or
engagements for an artist or artists.394
Drafted in this manner, the TAA would include an incidental booking exception that closely parallels New York’s
exception.395
Understandably, talent agents oppose the exception,
claiming that it would harm their business.396 They contend
that personal managers would have an advantage over talent agents because managers would be allowed to perform
agent functions without being subjected to the TAA’s regulations.397 However, proponents of the exception note that
personal managers would find it very difficult to perform
the functions of both manager and talent agent on a full-time
basis, particularly because a great amount of time is required
to perform either task by itself.398 Furthermore, proponents
of the exception maintain that, if the artist achieves even
some degree of success, this time-management issue would
soar, prompting most managers to secure a talent agent for
the client.399 Additionally, proponents argue that, because of
the influence talent agents have in the entertainment industry, enacting the exception would not significantly interfere
with their business.400

394. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (language in italics denotes proposed
change).
395. See discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing New York’s incidental booking exception).
396. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 510.
397. Id. at 510-11 (citing Hearings, supra note 83, at 49 (statement of Harry
Sloan)).
398. Id. at 511 (citing Hearings, supra note 83, at 230 (statement of R.L. Melcher, President, Association for Talent Representatives)).
399. Id. (citing Hearings, supra note 83, at 188 (statement of Joe Gottfried,
Conference of Personal Managers)).
400. Id. Commentators contend that it is unlikely that an incidental booking
exception would significantly reduce the amount of business available to talent
agents. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 511. They reason that talent agents control
the most important engagements and have exclusive agreements with most employers. Id.
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2. A Personal Managers Act
Commentator Gary Greenberg contends that amending
the TAA to include an incidental booking exception would
not solve the problem.401 Greenberg argues that the California legislature should provide personal managers with a
separate and specific statement concerning their activities.402
Accordingly, he suggests that California legislators enact a
PMA to expressly regulate personal managers.403
Greenberg contends that the PMA would serve two basic
functions: (1) providing personal managers and artists with
access to inexpensive dispute resolution; and (2) defining the
fiduciary obligations that personal managers owe to their
clients.404 Additionally, Greenberg maintains that the PMA
should define the personal manager’s activities.405 Furthermore, he asserts that the PMA should include an incidental
booking exception, thereby allowing personal managers to
engage in incidental procurement activities.406 Finally,
Greenberg argues that the PMA should avoid imposing restrictive requirements on the activities of personal managers.407
First, Greenberg observed that the TAA provides talent
agents and artists with an inexpensive form of dispute resolution.408 Greenberg contends that the PMA should contain
provisions for inexpensive dispute resolution, thereby benefiting both personal managers and artists.409
401. Id. at 512.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 514.
405. Id. at 512.
406. Id. at 514.
407. Id. at 513-14.
408. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (granting Labor Commissioner exclusive
jurisdiction in resolving disputes arising under the TAA).
409. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 512. Commentators assert that a similar
provision in the PMA would provide the same economic advantage to personal
managers and artists. Id. Proponents of the PMA maintain that the new statute
must specify the method of selecting hearing officers. Id. at 512 n.134. They al-
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Second, Greenberg suggests that a PMA would provide
personal managers with a definitive statement regarding
their required conduct.410 As noted above, personal managers and artists carry on highly personal relationships;411 also,
in many cases, an artist is vulnerable to the manager who is
controlling the artist’s career.412 As a result, Greenberg contends that the legislature should clearly establish the fiduciary obligations that personal managers owe to their clients.413
Third, Greenberg argues that the legislature should not
include restrictive requirements in the PMA.414 He contends
that the prohibitions and requirements of the new regulatory
statute should be designed to encourage personal management relationships.415 Greenberg reasons that restrictions
should not deter people from becoming personal managers,
nor should they heavily regulate personal managers’ compensation.416 Specifically, he maintains that the PMA should
be less restrictive than the TAA in the following ways: (1)
lude to the inequities in the enforcement of the TAA as an indication that not all
of the Labor Commissioner’s administrative law judges are familiar with the realities in the entertainment industry. Id. They would avoid this situation by
having groups representing artists and personal managers establish a list of hearing officers. Id. Alternatively, they would draft a selection process for agreeing
upon a hearing officer. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 512 n.134.
410. Id. at 512.
411. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (explaining that personal
managers and artists engage in personal relationships).
412. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 512.
413. Id. In a fiduciary relationship, one party depends upon another to satisfy certain needs, such as in an agency relationship. See generally Tamar Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983). At common law, misrepresentation
and misappropriation are actionable fiduciary violations. Greenberg, supra note
2, at 512 n.135. Commentators assert that the remedies available at common law
would be expanded by including a statutory requirement of utmost good faith in
the PMA. Id. at 512.
414. Id. at 513.
415. Id. According to the United States Senate Advisory Committee on Industrial Relations, regulations should develop the roles of creative entrepreneurs
and small businesses. Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE
SENATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 13 (1979)).
416. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 513. Proponents contend that the PMA
should impose as few restrictions as possible. Id.
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eliminate the requirement for a bond;417 (2) disregard the requirement that managers maintain a place of business separate from their residence;418 (3) minimize administrative fees
and charges;419 (4) minimize penalties for statute violations
(other than breach of fiduciary duty);420 and (5) avoid excessive penalties by delineating the damages available for specific violations.421 Greenberg contends that drafting the
PMA in this manner would ensure that the cost of complying with the statute would not deter many people from becoming personal managers.422
Greenberg concedes that, because of the various functions performed by personal managers, it would be difficult
to determine an appropriate fee limit.423 If fees are limited,
however, he asserts that the limits should conform to industry standards—at least twenty percent for musicians and fifteen percent for other artists.424 Additionally, Greenberg argues that the PMA should not limit the duration of
management agreements; nonetheless, if it does, any limitation should allow terms of at least five years for musicians
and three years for other artists.425
To protect artists, Greenberg contends that the PMA
should authorize the Labor Commissioner to terminate an
agreement when the personal manager is not applying his
“best efforts” to his management role.426 Moreover, as an
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 513.
421. Id.
422. Id. Commentators do not want compliance costs to deter people from
becoming personal managers. Id.
423. Id.
424. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 513. Proponents of the PMA use these figures because they were adopted as maximums by the Conference of Personal
Managers. Id. at 513 n.137
425. Id. at 513. Commentators argue that because personal managers are not
rewarded for their efforts until their clients achieve success, limiting their ability
to contract for a long term will deprive them of reasonable compensation. Id.
426. Id. at 513-14. Under this provision, the personal manager should be
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advantage to personal managers, Greenberg maintains that
managers should be allowed to obtain equity interests in clients.427
Greenberg also argues that the PMA should not require
personal managers to be licensed. First, he contends that licensing unnecessarily drives up compliance costs.428 Second, a PMA that establishes the conduct required by both
parties would render licensing unnecessary.429
Greenberg asserts that personal managers should be allowed to engage in procurement activities without obtaining
a talent agent’s license.430 He argues that the incidental
booking exception is the best solution,431 and that personal
managers should not be allowed to engage in unlimited procurement activities that would frustrate the purpose of the
TAA.432 Greenberg reasons that, if it is not possible to enact
a workable incidental booking exception, the current law
must be maintained.433
III. ENACTING THE PERSONAL MANAGERS ACT WOULD REMOVE
THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE WAISBREN DECISION
The Waisbren court’s decision to prohibit all unlicensed
procurement activities reflects the court’s misunderstanding
of entertainment industry realities,434 where personal mangiven the benefit of a presumption that he was acting reasonably. Greenberg,
supra note 2, at 514.
427. Id. Allowing equity interests will encourage managers to invest in clients. Id. Commentators contend that because the PMA includes a statement of
required fiduciary behavior, financial involvement will not create conflicts of interest. Id.
428. Id.
429. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 514.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. Proponents of the PMA do not advocate allowing personal managers to procure employment on an unlimited basis because that would neutralize
the TAA by punishing compliance. Id.
433. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 514.
434. See discussion supra part II.A.2 (describing the Waisbren decision).
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agers often must procure employment for artists.435 The
Waisbren decision, however, prohibits personal managers
from engaging in procurement activities without obtaining a
license.436 By enacting the PMA, the legislature would remove personal managers from the dilemma that they encounter under the Waisbren decision.437 The PMA protects
the interests of both personal managers and artists.438 Moreover, the PMA is compatible with the TAA and would therefore provide artists with greater protection.439 As detailed
below, this Comment argues that the California Legislature
should enact the PMA to govern personal managers.440
A. The Waisbren Court Interpreted the TAA Incorrectly
This Comment maintains that the Waisbren court’s interpretation of the TAA was flawed. The court should have interpreted the TAA as permitting unlicensed procurement of
employment on an incidental basis.
In Waisbren,441 the Court of Appeals held that any individual who procures employment for an artist must obtain a
talent agent’s license.442 The court arrived at this interpretation of the TAA by examining: (1) the plain meaning of the
TAA;443 (2) the remedial purpose of the TAA;444 (3) the Labor
435. See O’Brien, supra note 2, at 483-84 (stating that personal managers procure employment for artists); Abdo, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that managers
procure employment); see also discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing why most
personal managers procure employment for artists).
436. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437.
437. See discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing the dilemma that personal
managers face because they are not allowed to procure employment).
438. See discussion infra part III.B (explaining how the PMA protects the interests of both personal managers and artists).
439. See supra notes 83-88 (describing the purpose behind the TAA).
440. See supra notes 404-07 (describing how the PMA governs personal managers).
441. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437; see discussion supra part II.A.2 (discussing the Waisbren decision).
442. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437.
443. Id. at 441.
444. Id. at 441-42.
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Commissioner’s interpretation of the TAA;445 (4) recent legislative action;446 (5) the TAA’s exception for working in
concert with licensed talent agents;447 and (6) prior judicial
construction of the TAA.448 Yet, the court’s analysis was
flawed in its reasoning and examination of: (1) the TAA’s
plain meaning;449 (2) the TAA’s remedial purpose;450 (3) the
Labor Commissioner’s interpretation of the TAA;451 and (4)
the TAA’s exception for cooperating with licensed agents.452
First, the court inaccurately characterized the term “occupation” when it examined the TAA’s plain meaning.453
The TAA defines a “talent agency” as “a person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring . . . employment or engagements for an artist or artists.”454 The legislature included the term “occupation”
specifically to regulate talent agents—individuals whose
principal line of work is the procurement of employment.455
The Waisbren court, however, determined that an individual
could be engaged in an “occupation” even if it was not his
principal line of work.456 This definition contravened the

445. Id. at 442.
446. Id. at 442-45.
447. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
448. Id. at 445-46.
449. See supra notes 333-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Waisbren
court’s analysis of the TAA’s plain meaning).
450. See supra notes 339-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Waisbren
court’s analysis of the TAA’s remedial purpose).
451. See supra notes 344-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Waisbren
court’s analysis of the Labor Commissioner’s interpretation of the TAA).
452. See supra notes 355-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Waisbren
court’s analysis of the TAA’s exception for working in concert with licensed talent agents).
453. See Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441 (defining “occupation” broadly).
454. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (emphasis added) (defining “talent
agency”).
455. See Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503 (stating that an individual is engaged
in the occupation of procuring employment if their procurement efforts constitute a significant part of their business); see also discussion supra part II.A.1 (discussing Wachs decision).
456. See Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441 (defining “occupation” broadly).
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legislature’s intentions.
In similar fashion, the Waisbren court reasoned that the
legislature had included the term “occupation” in the TAA
to regulate individuals who receive compensation for their
procurement activities.457 Under this broad definition, the
TAA would define a “talent agency” as any person or corporation who is compensated for procuring employment or engagements for an artist or artists.458 But under this broad
definition of occupation, the term occupation is unnecessary
in defining talent agency459 because the TAA’s definition of
talent agency would be the same even if the word occupation was omitted. Therefore, if defined broadly, the term occupation is rendered superfluous in the TAA’s definition of
talent agency.460
Second, when the court examined the remedial purpose
behind the TAA, it erroneously assumed that unlicensed incidental procurement of employment harms artists.461 The
court properly recognized that the legislature enacted the
TAA to protect artists;462 however, the court also assumed
that personal managers abstain from obtaining a talent
agency license in order to take advantage of artists.463 The
court concluded that allowing unlicensed personal managers
to procure employment on an incidental basis would harm
artists and frustrate the TAA’s purpose.464 In doing so, the
court failed to acknowledge the indispensable role that personal managers play in the career development of artists.465
457. Id. at 441 n.6.
458. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (italics denote changes made to coincide
with the Waisbren court’s definition of occupation).
459. See id. (defining “talent agency”).
460. But see Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441 n.6.
461. Id. at 442.
462. Id. at 441; see also discussion supra part I.C.1.a (describing purpose behind the TAA).
463. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442.
464. Id.
465. See discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing unique role played by personal managers); see discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing why personal man-
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In most cases, an unlicensed personal manager procures
employment because no talent agent is willing to represent
the artist.466 Furthermore, the court ignored the entertainment industry reality that personal managers devote at least
incidental portions of their time to procuring employment
for artists.467 Consequently, the court failed to recognize the
personal manager’s dilemma concerning the procurement of
employment.
The court’s assumption that the artist is the victim in actions under the TAA was similarly meritless.468 Artists initiate most cases to void their management agreements only after becoming successful, typically to avoid compensating the
personal manager who helped them develop their careers.469
These cases often involve TAA violations based on the manager’s failure to comply with the licensing requirement.470
Such artists seek to void the management agreement on the
contention that the personal manager has performed talent
agent functions without a license.471 Thus, the alleged TAA
violations involve the procurement of employment without
a license—activities that actually help the artist—rather than
any action which might harm the artist’s career.472 Consequently, the courts proceeded under an incorrect assumptions.
agers engage in unlicensed procurement of employment).
466. Taubman, supra note 44, at 85; Quast, supra note 35, at 203; see also discussion supra part I.A.1 (describing why talent agents do not represent aspiring
artists).
467. See discussion supra part I.A.2 (stating that personal managers engage
in unlicensed procurement of employment). The court observed that personal
managers may be in situations where they would like to procure employment.
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441. The court’s observation, however, ignored the
fact that most personal managers must procure employment for their clients. See
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 483-84; Abdo, supra note 35, at 3.
468. Id. at 492; see discussion supra part I.C.1.c (describing harsh penalties
that may be imposed on personal managers for engaging in unlicensed procurement activities).
469. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 492.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.

994

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[7:927

Additionally, the court incorrectly assumed that the “significant part test”473 included a vague and unworkable standard.474 This Comment contends that there is a workable
standard behind the “significant part test” and the “incidental booking exception.”475 The “significant part test” includes
the same standard as the “incidental booking exception: “476
unlicensed procurement is permissible if it is incidental to
the managerial role.477 New York’s regulatory system contains an “incidental booking exception” for personal managers.478 Furthermore, the New York courts have administered
the exception with ease.479 Additionally, after Wachs, the
California Labor Commissioner employed the “significant
part test” when determining whether a talent agency license
was necessary for procuring employment.480 Therefore, both
the “significant part test” and the “incidental booking exception” are based upon the same workable standard.
Third, when examining the Labor Commissioner’s interpretation of the TAA, the court ignored instances in which
the Commissioner permitted unlicensed procurement on an
incidental basis.481 Consequently, the court incorrectly
473. See discussion supra part II.A.1 (describing the significant part test that
was adopted in Wachs); see also discussion supra part I.B.3 (describing the centerof-gravity test that was adopted in Barr).
474. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442.
475. But see id.
476. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (describing the incidental booking exception); see also discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing New York’s incidental
booking exception).
477. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (describing the incidental booking exception); see also discussion supra part I.C.1 (describing New York’s incidental
booking exception).
478. See discussion supra part I.D.1 (describing New York’s incidental booking exception).
479. See O’Brien, supra note 2, at 509 (noting that New York courts have had
little difficulty administering the exception); see also discussion supra part I.D.2
(describing New York cases that have administered the exception).
480. See, e.g., Church v. Brown, No. TAC 52-92 (1994); see also Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7 (stating that the Labor Commissioner employed the significant
part test after Wachs).
481. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442.
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stated the Labor Commissioner’s position as requiring a license for any procurement of employment.482 Prior to the
Waisbren decision, the Labor Commissioner allowed unlicensed procurement on an incidental basis.483 In Barr, the
Labor Commissioner adopted the center-of-gravity test,
thereby allowing personal managers to participate in employment negotiations if their primary concern was the artist’s career direction.484 In Wachs, the Labor Commissioner’s
attorney presented the significant part test to the court to
support the constitutionality of the TAA.485 Furthermore, after Wachs, the Labor Commissioner employed the significant
part test to allow unlicensed procurement of employment
when it was incidental to the managerial role.486 The Waisbren court, however, ignored the Labor Commissioner’s rulings on the interpretation of the TAA that allowed unlicensed procurement.487
Therefore, the Waisbren court
incorrectly stated the Labor Commissioner’s position.488
Finally, the court reasoned fallaciously that the TAA did
not allow the unlicensed procurement of employment because it specifically included an exception for working in
concert with licensed talent agents.489 The court assumed
that personal managers only incidentally cooperate with li-

482. Id.
483. See supra note 486 and accompanying text (noting that the Labor Commissioner employed the significant part test after Wachs).
484. See discussion supra part I.C.3 (describing the center-of-gravity test that
was adopted in Barr).
485. Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7; see discussion supra part II.A.1
(describing the significant part test that was adopted in Wachs).
486. See, e.g., Church v. Brown, No. TAC 52-92 (1994); see also Steinberg, supra note 7, at B7 (observing that the Labor Commissioner employed the significant part test after Wachs); Licensing Personal Managers, supra note 7 (stating that
after Wachs, the Labor Commissioner’s office employed the significant part test).
487. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442.
488. But see id.
489. See id. at 445 (reasoning that the exception for working with licensed
agents would be unnecessary if incidental procurement did not require a license).
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censed agents,490 and reasoned that the exception for cooperating with licensed agents would be unnecessary if the
TAA allowed the unlicensed procurement of employment
on an incidental basis.491
The TAA’s exception for working with licensed agents,
however, is fully compatible with allowing unlicensed procurement on an incidental basis.492 This exception and the
“incidental booking exception” are not mutually exclusive
they can work together. The TAA’s exception for working
with talent agents allows personal managers to negotiate
employment contracts if their efforts are in concert with, and
at the request of, a licensed agent.493 The “significant part
test” implicitly contains an “incidental booking exception”
that allows personal managers to procure employment when
it is incidental to their managerial role.494 Under the “incidental booking exception,” personal managers can engage in
procurement activities that are incidental to their managerial
role.495 Additionally, if a personal manager wants to negotiate employment contracts, and such activities would not fit
under the incidental booking exception, the manager can satisfy the requirements for working with a licensed agent.496
In other words, the exception for working with agents allows unlicensed personal managers to negotiate employment contracts when such efforts are not allowed under the

490. The court reasoned that allowing unlicensed procurement if it was incidental to the managerial role would render the exception for working with
agents unnecessary. Id. However, the court assumed that when personal managers avail themselves of the exception for cooperating with agents, their efforts
are incidental to their managerial role.
491. Id.
492. The TAA could contain both exceptions.
493. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d). See discussion supra part I.C.1.b (describing the exception for working in concert with a licensed talent agent).
494. See discussion supra part II.A.1 (describing the significant part test); see
also discussion supra part II.B.1 (describing incidental booking exception).
495. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (describing incidental booking exception).
496. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d).
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incidental booking exception.497 Thus, the TAA can contain
an incidental booking exception without rendering the exception for working with agents superfluous.498
B. Enacting the PMA Would Be Advantageous to Both
Personal Managers and Artists
Personal managers and artists would benefit if the California Legislature enacted the PMA.499 By recognizing the
practices of the industry, the PMA: (1) encourages individuals to perform personal management services,500 and (2) protects the interests of artists employing personal management
services.501 Adoption of the PMA would be favorable to personal managers and artists because it would acknowledge
the realities in the entertainment industry.502
1. The PMA Protects the Interests of Personal
Managers and Encourages Individuals to Perform
Personal Management Services
Enacting the PMA would encourage individuals to provide personal management services because the PMA would
recognize certain realities of the entertainment industry.503
The PMA recognizes that: (1) personal managers must procure employment for artists;504 (2) personal managers endure

497. See id.
498. But see Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr 2d. at 445.
499. See discussion supra part II.B.2 (describing how personal managers and
artists would benefit from the legislature enacting the PMA).
500. See discussion infra part III.B.1 (describing how the PMA encourages
individuals to provide personal management services).
501. See discussion infra part III.B.2 (describing how the PMA protects the
interests of artists).
502. Not only does the PMA acknowledge the industry realities, but it includes provisions which were drafted to remove specific problems currently
found in the industry.
503. See discussion supra part I.A.2 (describing why personal managers engage in procurement efforts on behalf of their clients).
504. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that personal managers do procure employment for clients).
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a higher level of risk than talent agents;505 (3) personal managers have disputes with artists other than those involving
violations of the TAA;506 (4) the restrictions contained in the
TAA provide a disincentive for personal managers to obtain
talent agency licenses;507 and (5) under the TAA, the law was
ambiguous because it was not consistently enforced.508
First, the PMA contains an incidental booking exception
because personal managers do procure employment for artists.509 In their day-to-day activities, personal managers face
situations in which they must procure employment for artists.510 Under the TAA, personal managers may not procure
employment without a license.511 Therefore, personal managers often find themselves in the following dilemma: they
could engage in unlicensed procurement and risk receiving
severe penalties from the Labor Commissioner,512 or they
could subject themselves to the great expense of complying
with the TAA and the entertainment union regulations.513
The PMA recognizes that personal managers are called upon
to procure employment, and allows them to do so on an incidental basis.514
505. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (explaining why personal
managers endure greater risk than talent agents).
506. Personal managers and artists have disputes regarding matters other
than whether the personal manager has obtained a talent agency license.
507. See discussion supra part I.C.1.b (describing restrictive regulations that
must be followed pursuant to the TAA).
508. See discussion supra part I.C.1.d (explaining how the TAA is ambiguous); see also discussion supra part II.A (demonstrating how the TAA has been
enforced inconsistently).
509. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that personal managers do procure employment for clients).
510. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 490.
511. See discussion supra part II.A.2 (describing the Waisbren holding that
precludes unlicensed procurement of employment).
512. See discussion supra part I.C.1.c (explaining the Labor Commissioner’s
authority to penalize unlicensed procurement efforts).
513. See discussion supra part I.C.2 (illustrating how entertainment unions
regulate licensed talent agents).
514. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (describing incidental booking exception); see also discussion supra part II.B.2 (explicating the PMA).
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Second, the PMA recognizes that personal managers endure a high level of risk; consequently, it does not restrict
compensation or the terms of contracts, but rather allows
managers to obtain equity interests in their clients.515 Personal managers face a higher level of risk than talent
agents.516 Because they represent unestablished artists, personal managers need a longer contract term to receive adequate compensation for their services.517 Furthermore, personal management services include both personal and
business concerns.518
Additionally, when representing
unestablished artists, personal managers are often called
upon to invest their own money in the artist’s projects.519
The PMA acknowledges these practical matters and protects
the personal manager’s freedom to contract for favorable
provisions.520
Third, the PMA provides access to inexpensive dispute
resolution.521 This recognizes the reality that disputes between personal managers and artists involve issues other
than violations of the TAA.522 Under the TAA, personal
managers and artists can employ the Labor Commissioner to
resolve disputes that involve potential violations of the
TAA.523 Personal managers and artists, however, often have
515. See supra note 427 and accompanying text (stating that the PMA allows
personal managers to obtain equity interests in their clients).
516. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (explaining why personal
managers endure greater risk than talent agents).
517. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (discussing why personal
managers represent unestablished artists).
518. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text (describing the personal
manager’s role in both personal and business concerns).
519. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (stating that personal managers frequently invest in their clients’ projects).
520. See supra notes 423-27 and accompanying text (describing personal
manager’s freedom to contract under the PMA).
521. See supra notes 408-09 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA
provides access to inexpensive dispute resolution).
522. See supra note 506 (explaining that personal managers and artists have
disputes regarding issue other than unlicensed procurement).
523. See supra note 408 and accompanying text (stating that the TAA provides dispute resolution for problems arising under the TAA).
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disputes that do not involve the TAA. Presently, they do not
have access to an inexpensive forum where they can resolve
such controversies. The PMA acknowledges this fact and
authorizes the Labor Commissioner to resolve disputes that
arise under the PMA.524
Fourth, because the PMA would contain fewer compliance costs than the TAA, less people would be deterred from
becoming personal managers.525 The significant compliance
costs associated with the TAA is one reason why personal
managers do not obtain talent agency licenses.526 Instead,
the PMA limits the restrictions placed on personal managers
and keeps the cost of compliance very low.527 Thus, the
PMA does not deter people from providing personal management services.
Finally, the PMA contains a statement describing the personal manager’s required conduct.528 This pronouncement
helps avoid the ambiguity that surrounded the judiciary’s
inconsistent enforcement of the TAA.529 The TAA included
the ambiguous term, “procurement,”530 which left reasonable
people guessing whether they had violated the licensing requirement.531 Additionally, the Labor Commissioner and
courts did not consistently enforce the TAA.532 In Barr, the

524. See supra note 409 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA provides access to inexpensive dispute resolution).
525. See supra notes 414-22 and accompanying text (describing how the PMA
would contain fewer restrictions than the TAA).
526. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 491.
527. See supra note 422 and accompanying text (explaining that the PMA
does not deter individuals from becoming personal managers).
528. See supra notes 410-13 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA describes the personal manager’s required conduct).
529. See supra notes 410-13 and accompanying text (explaining the definitive
statement provided by the PMA).
530. See discussion supra part I.C.1.d (describing the ambiguity that surrounded the term “procurement”).
531. O’Brien, supra note 2, at 497.
532. See discussion supra part II.A (discussing conflicting interpretations of
the TAA).
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Labor Commissioner employed a center-of-gravity test.533 In
Wachs, the court adopted the significant part test.534 In Waisbren, the court rejected the significant part test in favor of a
rule that prohibited any unlicensed procurement of employment.535 Conversely, the PMA would avoid ambiguity
and inconsistency by including a definitive statement of the
personal manager’s required conduct. This would remove
many of the TAA’s shortcomings and would encourage individuals to become personal managers.
2. The PMA Protects Artists’ Interests and
Encourages Artists to Engage the Services of
Personal Managers
In addition to helping personal managers, enacting the
PMA would also protect artists’ interests by recognizing certain entertainment industry realities.536 The PMA acknowledges that: (1) artists need personal managers to procure
employment on their behalf;537 (2) artists have disputes with
personal managers other than those involving violations of
the TAA;538 and (3) the Labor Commissioner should be authorized to terminate management agreements when the
manager is not providing his best efforts.539
First, the PMA contains an incidental booking exception
because artists need personal managers to engage in the pro533. See discussion supra part I.C.3 (illustrating the Labor Commissioner’s
use of the center-of-gravity test).
534. See discussion supra part II.A.1 (describing the adoption of the significant part test).
535. See discussion supra part II.A.2 (explaining the rejection of the significant part test).
536. If the legislature enacts the PMA, artists will be protected better than
under the TAA alone.
537. This is particularly true in the case of an aspiring artist who is unable to
gain the representation of a talent agent. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 490.
538. See supra note 506 and accompanying text (explaining that artists have
disputes with personal managers that do not concern the TAA).
539. See supra note 426 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA authorizes the Labor Commissioner to terminate a contract when the personal manager
has failed to provide his best efforts).
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curement of employment.540 Aspiring artists employ the
services of a personal manager before they can gain the representation of a talent agent.541 Without an agent, artists are
forced to rely on personal managers for procurement of employment.542 The PMA acknowledges this fact and allows
personal managers to procure employment for artists on an
incidental basis.543
Second, the PMA provides artists with access to inexpensive dispute resolution for controversies with personal managers.544 Presently, artists and personal managers do not
have a forum where they can resolve disputes involving issues other than violations of the TAA. The PMA recognizes
the importance of inexpensive dispute resolution and authorizes the Labor Commissioner to provide artists and
managers with such a mechanism.545
Finally, the PMA authorizes the Labor Commissioner to
terminate a management contract when personal managers
do not put forth their best efforts, because there is no limit
on the terms of management contracts.546 Artists may be
vulnerable to personal managers who control their careers.547 This risk may be increased under the PMA because
it provides personal managers with greater freedom to con540. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that personal managers need to procure employment on behalf of artists).
541. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (explaining why aspiring
artists employ personal management services before talent agency services).
542. Artists find it difficult to procure employment on their own behalf.
543. See supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA
contains an incidental booking exception).
544. See supra notes 403-09 and accompanying text (describing why the PMA
provides inexpensive dispute resolution).
545. See supra notes 408-09 and accompanying text (noting that the PMA
provides access to inexpensive dispute resolution).
546. See supra note 426 and accompanying text (stating that the PMA provides the Labor Commissioner with the authority to terminate contracts when
the personal manager is not rendering his best efforts).
547. See supra notes 411-12 and accompanying text (noting that the personal
nature of the relationship might lead an artist to be vulnerable to the personal
manager who is controlling the artist’s career).
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tract.548 The PMA, however, alleviates this risk by authorizing the Labor Commissioner to terminate contracts when
personal managers do not provide their best efforts to fulfill
their managerial obligations.
By realizing how the TAA interferes with their interests,
the PMA is able to increase the protection afforded to artists.
CONCLUSION
Personal managers provide invaluable services to the aspiring artist. Unable to obtain representation from talent
agents, aspiring artists often turn to personal managers for
guidance and career development. Both artists and managers cooperate to increase the artists’ chances for success. By
procuring employment, personal managers, however, may
be subject to the TAA. The California Court of Appeals have
disagreed over the TAA’s application to personal managers.
A personal manager, who does not have a talent agent’s license, may receive harsh punishment from the Labor Commissioner for any involvement in procuring employment for
an artist. The unique services that a personal manager provides cannot be found elsewhere in the entertainment industry. Enactment of a Personal Managers Act will regulate
personal managers. Subjecting personal managers to the
TAA places a burdensome obligation on managers. To prevent the problems created by recent judicial decisions, and
still protect artists, the California legislature should enact a
Personal Managers Act with an incidental booking exception.

548. See supra notes 414-22 and accompanying text (explaining how the
PMA provides personal managers with greater freedom to contract).

